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Chapter 1
Introduction
The automatic recognition of object (pattern recognition), and their description,
classification and aggregation (clustering) are very important fields for a large
variety of problems both in the engineering and in the scientific fields.
Watanabe defines a pattern “as opposite of chaos; it is an entity, vaguely de-
fined, that could be given a name.” For example a pattern could be a fingerprint
image, a handwritten cursive word, a human face, or a speech signal [75][40].
Pattern recognition methods offer technological background for a variety of
applications in a modern information society. In some cases, they are however
undermined by several kinds of “adversarial” misuses like email and web spam,
attacks to computer networks, etc. A classical example of such “adversarial” envi-
ronments are various evasion techniques used in generation of spam emails. Sim-
ilar problems arise in web search (web spam) and malware analysis (obfuscation
and polymorphism).
The underlying problem is that pattern recognition, as well as data analysis
techniques in general, have not been designed to work in adversarial environ-
ments.
These considerations give rise with the necessity to define new methodologies
to overcome this type of problems, either they are produced during the training
phase (Adversarial Learning), or they are obtained during the classification phase
(Adversarial Classification).
To this aim, recently in the area of machine learning the concept of combining
1
2classifiers is proposed as a new direction for the improvement of the performance
of individual classifiers. These classifiers could be based on a variety of classifi-
cation methodologies, and they could achieve different rate of correctly classified
samples. The goal of classification result integration algorithms is to generate
more accurate system results but a classification more robust to noise.
We found in the Multi Classification System theory also a good support to
design and train a classification system in adversarial environments. We studied
this problem focus on some interesting case studies such as: the cleaning of a
noisy/contaminated training set, the spam recognition, the Internet traffic flows
detection.
More in general, we tackle the two main challenges directly linked to the gen-
eral problem of adversarial environments, that is: i) adversarial learning, in
which the labels of training pattern were corrupted; ii) adversarial classification
in which a malicious user try to camouflage the patterns when the classifier oper-
ates on the field.
In particular, in the adversarial learning field, we have defined a novel Multi-
ple Classifier System approach designed to clean the noisy/contaminated training
set. This system, after an iterative evolution, returns a cleaned training set ob-
tained changing the labels assigned to the samples and considering the training
set cleaned when these changes become stable.
The second challenge was the adversarial classification. In this case the ma-
licious users try detect the vulnerability of a security system to bypass it. In this
context we considered two case studies, in which we proposed some original sys-
tems based on a MCS: i) the spam recognition, in which the spammer are always
looking for some vulnerabilities to brake down the user antispam policies and ii)
the Internet traffic identification, in which malicious users try to bypass the secu-
rity policies of an Internet network, using, for example, some allowed protocols
to make something different.
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1.1 Thesis Outline
After briefly introducing the main context of this thesis, in this section we will
give a synthetic outline of the rest of the work. In chapter 2 we will introduce
the general problem of the Adversarial Environment and we will describe the two
challenges directly linked to it, i.e. Adversarial Learning and Adversarial Classi-
fication.
In chapter 3 we will provide some notions about the classification theory, and,
after a general introduction of the Multiple Classifiers Systems (MCS), we will
give some possible taxonomies.
In chapter 4 we will tackle the problem of the Adversarial Learning, in partic-
ular for the noisy/contaminated label into the training set. In this chapter we will
introduce a methodology to clean a training set, and we will make a comparison
between a simple classifier trained with the cleaned dataset obtained with the pro-
posed approach, and the accuracy obtained with some Multiple Classifier System
presented in the literature.
In chapter 5 we will present a typical Adversarial Classification problem in the
context of the identification of the Internet traffic flows. In this chapter, the traffic
problem will be dealt with a statistical approach implemented by a Hierarchical
Multiple Classifier System.
In Chapter 6 we will approach another problem of Adversarial Classification,
i.e. the spam recognition. In this chapter we will describe a modular architecture
to adapt the system to new and smarter spammer’s attacks.
Finally, in Chapter 7 some conclusions are drawn. Our contribution is pointed
out, referring to the previously described work, and some directions and proposals
for future works are proposed.
Chapter 2
Adversarial Environments
Machine learning techniques are often used in environments where adversaries
can consciously act to limit or prevent accurate performance. A classical exam-
ple is spam filtering where spammers tailor messages to avoid the most recent
spam detection techniques. Further examples of adversarial environments arise in
the field of computer security where there is an escalating competition between
detection and evasion techniques for various types of malware. In general, one
can expect that whenever machine learning is used to provide protection from
some illegal activity, adversaries will deliberately attempt to circumvent these ap-
proaches.
Pattern recognition systems, and in particular multiple classifier systems, are
currently used in several security applications like biometric identity recognition
[5][63][55], intrusion detection in computer networks [33][34][49][62] and spam
filtering [9][11][22][31][68], in which the task is to discriminate attack samples
(e.g., a spam e-mail) from legitimate samples (e.g., legitimate e-mails).
An interesting paper in the context of machine learning security is the one by
Barreno et al [6] where the authors try to give an answer to the four following
questions:
• Can the adversary manipulate a learning system to permit a specific attack?
For example, can an attacker leverage knowledge about the machine learn-
ing system used by a spam e-mail filtering system to bypass the filtering?
• Can an adversary degrade the performance of a learning system to the extent
4
5Integrity Availability
Causative Targeted Permit a specific intrusion Create a sufficient errors to
make system unusable for
one person or service
Indiscriminate Permit at least one intru-
sion
Create sufficient errors to
make learner unusable
Exploratory Targeted Find a permitted intrusion
from a small set of possi-
bilities
Find a set of points mis-
classified by the learner
Indiscriminate Find a permitted intrusion
Table 2.1: An Attack Model
that system administrators are forced to disable the IDS? For example, could
the attacker confuse the system and cause valid e-mail to be rejected?
• What defences exist against adversaries manipulating (attacking) learning
systems?
• More generally, what is the potential impact from a security standpoint of
using machine learning on a system? Can an attacker exploit properties of
the machine learning technique to disrupt the system?
More in general they made a general taxonomy of the possible attacks to a
machine learning system, table 2.1.
For Berreno at al, in the causative attacks the adversary has some measure
of control over the training of the learner, from the classifier point of view these
kinds of attacks are considered as a problem of Adversarial Learning.
In the Exploratory attacks the adversary do not attempt to influence learning:
they instead attempt to discover information about the state of the learner, that is
the attackers seek to find intrusions that are not recognized by the learner. From
the classifier point of view these attacks can be considered as Adversarial Classi-
fication problems.
In this thesis we will analyse the two challenges directly linked to the Ad-
versarial Environment problem, that is Adversarial Learning and Adversarial
Classification from the Multiple Classifier Systems (MCS) point of view.
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It is experimentally demonstrated that the combination of more classifiers can
achieve better classification accuracy in respect of a single classifier [15][47].
Only recently, there are few works that are analysing how the MCSs can be
robust in an Adversarial Environment [10].
2.1 Challenges
The main difference between Adversarial Learning and Adversarial Classification
is in how and where the malicious users try to camouflage the patterns.
While in the first one the attacker contaminates the training pattern to make
more difficult the classification problem (from the learner point of view), in the
second case the attacker changes the patters when the classifier operates on the
field to overcome the security system, i.e make more difficult the problem from
the predictor point of view.
2.1.1 Adversarial Learning
Systems using machine learning have been successfully deployed for fighting
spam, fraud, and other malicious activities. These systems typically consist of
a classifier that flags certain instances as malicious based on a fixed set of fea-
tures. For example, spam filters classify each incoming email message as spam
or legitimate email by using a set of features such as which words are present.
Unfortunately, as classifiers become more widely deployed, the incentive for de-
feating them increases. In some domains, there is ample evidence that adversaries
are actively modifying their behaviour to avoid detection. For instance, senders of
junk email often disguise their messages by adding unrelated words, sentences, or
even paragraphs more indicative of legitimate email than spam [51].
The earliest theoretical work we know of that approaches learning in the pres-
ence of an adversary was done by Kearns and Li [45]. They worked in the context
of Valiants Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework [35, 36],
extending it to prove bounds for maliciously chosen errors in the training data.
Specifically, they proved that if the learner is to perform correctly, in general the
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fraction of training points controlled by the adversary must be less than ǫ
1 + ǫ
,
where ǫ is the desired bound on classification errors by the learner [4, 6, 30].
Results from game theory may be relevant to adversarial learning systems. In
particular, deception games involve players that have partial information and in-
fluence the information seen by other players. Some of these games involve con-
tinuous variables generated by various probability distributions [7], while others
apply to scenarios with discrete states [37]. The game theory and the adversar-
ial learning both ask many of the same questions, and they both address the same
underlying issues. Integration of game theoretic concepts could be a promising
direction for work in adversarial learning area.
Dalvi et al. examine the learn-adapt-relearn cycle from a game-theoretic point
of view [18]. In their model, the learner has a cost for measuring each feature of
the data and the adversary has a cost for changing each feature in attack points.
If the adversary and learner have complete information about each other and we
accept some other assumptions, they find an optimal strategy for the learner to
defend against the adversary’s adaptations.
Research has also begun to examine the vulnerability of learners to reverse
engineering. Lowd and Meek introduce a novel learning problem for adversar-
ial classifier reverse engineering in which an adversary conducts an attack that
minimizes a cost function [51]. Under their framework, Lowd and Meek con-
struct algorithms for reverse engineering linear classifiers. Moreover, they build
an attack to reverse engineer spam filters [52].
2.1.2 Adversarial Classification
Wittel and Wu [77] discuss the possibility of crafting attacks designed to take ad-
vantage of the statistical nature of such spam filters, and they implement a simple
attack. John Graham-Cumming [35] describes implementing an attack he calls
Bayes vs. Bayes, in which the adversary trains a second statistical spam filter
based on feedback from the filter under attack and then uses the second filter to
find words that make spam messages undetectable by the original filter.
A recent work of Biggio et al [10] analyses the effectiveness of the Multiple
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Classifiers Systems in improving the hardness of evasion. To this aim they develop
analytical models of adversarial classification problems and apply them to analyse
some strategies currently used to implement MCSs in several applications. They
define the hardness of evasion as:
For a given feature set, the hardness of evasion is defined as the ex-
pected value of the minimum number of features which have to be
modified to evade the classifier.
Very interesting is the figure 2.1 taken from their work and re-proposed here
in which is reported an example of the two measures which should be used to
evaluate the performance of a classifier in a security system: the classification
accuracy against a given strategy used by the adversary (represented by training
instances), and the hardness of evasion against a new kinds of attacks.
Figure 2.1: Hardness of Evasion vs Accuracy (from [10]
2.2 Applications
We have worked on the two challenges presented before, and in particular we have
proposed different methodology to make the system more robust in this kind of
environments. In particular we can distinguish three tasks:
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• Adversarial Learning
– Noisy/Contaminated Training Set
• Adversarial Classification
– Spam e-mail
– Internet traffic flows identification
2.2.1 Adversarial Learning: Noisy/Contaminated Training Set
There is not much literature on how noise label should be modelled and dealt with
an MCS approach.
AdaBoost [30] has shown to often improve the base learner accuracy. Since
its introduction, it has been successfully applied to many problems. Furthermore,
the AdaBoost idea has been extended to other sort of problems. Although it has
wide-spread success, it is susceptible to the over-fitting problem as pointed out
by Dietterich [21]. Oza [61] proposed an approach called AveBoost2 to smooth
noise. This approach can be seen as a relaxed version of AdaBoost. When training
examples are noisy and therefore difficult to fit, AdaBoost is known to increase
the weights of those examples to excess and over-fit them because many consec-
utive base models may not learn them properly. AveBoost2s averaging does not
allow the weights of noisy examples to increase rapidly, thereby mitigating the
overfitting problem.
Thiel [73] made a comparison between the single classifier and an ensemble.
In his paper the attention is focused on which impact a dataset with soft labels has
on a noisy training set.
Melville and Mooney [57] introduced a new kind of multiple classifier sys-
tem to take into account the noise label problem; they called it DECORATE.
DECORATE, (Diverse Ensemble Creation by Oppositional Relabelling of Ar-
tificial Training Examples) uses an existing ”strong” learner (one that provides
high accuracy on the training data) to build an effective diverse committee in a
fairly simple, straightforward manner. This is accomplished by adding different
2.2. APPLICATIONS 10
randomly constructed examples to the training set when building new committee
members. These artificially constructed examples are given category labels that
disagree with the current decision of the committee, thereby easily and directly
increasing diversity when a new classifier is trained on the augmented data and
added to the committee.
2.2.2 Adversarial Classification: SPAM
It is a well-known story that e-mail has grown from a tool used by few universities
and scientists to a ubiquitous communication tool, evolving from simple plain text
into a powerful multimedia message. At the same time, following the growth of
e-mail production and diffusion, spam has changed from a little and sometimes
bothering problem into a multi-billion dollar problem. The presence of spam, in
fact, can seriously compromise normal user activities, forcing to navigate through
mailboxes to find the - relatively few - interesting e-mails, so wasting time and
bandwidth and occupying huge storage space.
The types of those messages vary: some of them contains advertisements,
other e-mails provides winning notifications, and sometimes we get messages with
executable files, which finally emerge as malicious codes, such as viruses and
Trojan horses. In addition, spam e-mails may often have unsuitable content (as
a pornographic material advertising) that is illegal and sometimes dangerous for
non adult users.
The recognition of spam content is not a trivial problem: there are some factors
that are related with human perception, economic behaviour, legal context, that
are hardly measurable or summarized in adequate features. The same definition
of spam e-mails requires a common agreement that is not easy to find.
In our opinion, all kind of spam e-mails have several common characteristics,
such as: i) they are unsolicited, ii) they have a commercial content, even though
the content itself is continuously evolving, trying to outsmart the classical coun-
termeasures adopted by anti-spam filters.
This kind of task belong to the adversarial classification problems, since
there is an intelligent, adaptive adversary who tries to camouflage patterns (spam
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e-mails) to evade the security system.
Consequently, a great variety of technical methodology have been implemented
in current anti-spam systems [11]. The common technical solutions propose fil-
tering strategies based on sender address and/or body content. We focused our
attention on that measures related to e-mail contents, in particular both texts and
images, rather then on networking and identity strategies [68], since our goal is to
develop a personal antispam system.
2.2.3 Adversarial Classification: Traffic Identification
In the last years, networking research has started facing a problem not foreseen
when the first Internet protocols were originally designed: network traffic classi-
fication, that is, associating traffic flows to the applications that generated them
[56]. Originally each network application used known protocols and transport-
level ports that easily allowed their identification. Since a few years back, this is
not true any more [42, 59]. The number of network applications using proprietary
undisclosed protocols has grown at an incredible rate (Skype, P2P-IPTV); the typ-
ical association application/port is often forged; in some cases traffic is encrypted,
whereas sometimes it is encapsulated into traditional protocols. Beyond the need
to understand which kind of traffic is carried on Internet links, the identification of
traffic hidden in flows using well-known ports represents a challenging task. For
these reasons, new approaches to traffic identification are needed. By traffic iden-
tification here we mean identification of a particular (or a group of) applications
of interest.
This is a typical case of study for the Adversarial Classification problem. In
this case some malicious users try to overcame the classification system in differ-
ent ways. A possibility is to spoof a protocol into another.
Chapter 3
Classifier Ensembles
Recently in the area of machine learning the concept of combining classifiers has
been proposed as a new direction for the improvement of the performance of in-
dividual classifiers. These classifiers could be based on a variety of classification
methodologies, and they could achieve different rates of correctly classified indi-
viduals. The goal of classification result integration algorithms is to generate more
certain, precise and accurate system results. Dietterich [21] provides an accessi-
ble and informal reasoning, from statistical, computational and representational
viewpoints, on why ensembles can improve results.
The combination of multiple classifiers can be considered as a generic pattern
recognition problem in which the input consists of the results of the individual
classifiers, and the output is the combined decision [72].
Organization of the Chapter
After a general presentation of the pattern recognition problem, we will discuss
a general taxonomy of base classifiers; after that we will describe Multiple Clas-
sifier Systems, hereinafter MCS and we will consider the pros and cons of some
common topologies. We will describe the combination approaches, giving, in
the last section, some theoretical details on the Dempster-Shafer combination ap-
proach, and on why this approach could be important to overcome some limits of
the bayesian one. Finally we will make some practical considerations.
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3.1 Pattern Recognition
Watanabe defines a pattern “as opposite of chaos; it is an entity, vaguely defined,
that could be given a name.” For example a pattern could be a fingerprint image,
a handwritten cursive word, a human face, or a speech signal [75][40].
Given a pattern, its recognition/classification may consist of one of the follow-
ing two tasks:
1. Supervised Classification: the input pattern is identified as a member of a
predefined class
2. Unsupervised Classification: the input pattern is assigned to a hitherto
unknown class.
Generally speaking, the design of a pattern recognition system essentially in-
volves the following three aspects:
1. data acquisition and preprocessing
2. data representation
3. decision making
The most popular approaches could be divided into: 1) Template matching, 2)
Statistical classification, 3) Syntactic or structural matching, 4) Neural networks.
Template matching is one of the simplest the earliest developed approaches.
Matching is a generic operation in pattern recognition which is used to determine
the similarity between two entities of the same type. In general, a template or
a prototype is always available. Often, the template itself is learned from the
training set.
Statistical classification is based on a representation in terms of d features
or characteristics. In this case each pattern is seen as a point in a d-dimensional
space. Given a set of training patterns from each class, the objective is to estab-
lish decision boundaries in the feature space which separate patterns belonging to
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Figure 3.1: General Statistical Pattern Recognition Model
different classes. In this case the recognition system is operated in two modes:
training (learning) and classification (testing) as shown in figure 3.1.
In most of the recognition problems involving complex patterns, it is more
appropriate to adopt a hierarchical perspective where a pattern is viewed as being
composed of simple sub-patterns. In Syntactical pattern recognition, a formal
analogy is drawn between the structure of patterns and the syntax of the language.
Neural networks can be viewed as massively parallel computing systems con-
sisting of an extremely large number of simple processors with many interconnec-
tions. The main characteristics of neural networks are that they have the ability to
learn complex non linear input-output relationship, use sequential training proce-
dures, and adapt themselves to the data.
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Approach Representation Recognition Function Typical Criterion
Samples, Correlation,
Template matching pixels, distance, Classification error
curves measure
Statistical Features Discriminant function Classification error
Syntactic
or Primitives Rules, grammar Acceptance error
Structural
Samples, Mean
Neural networks pixels, Network function square
features error
Table 3.1: Pattern Recognition Models
3.1.1 Feature selection and extraction
Such a representation requires the definition of the possible categories which have
to be recognized, and also the description of the entities to classify in terms of a
certain number of parameters. Such parameters are usually referred to as features
[51]. Features are usually represented in arrays, and can be distinguished accord-
ing to the type of value they can assume. They are usually grouped into two sets,
as depicted in figure 3.2: quantitative features and qualitative features.
The conceptual boundary between feature extraction and classification is some-
what arbitrary: an ideal feature extractor would yield a representation that makes
the job of the classifier trivial; conversely, an omnipotent classifier would not need
the help of a sophisticated feature extractor. The distinction is forced for practical,
rather than theoretical reasons. Generally speaking, the task of feature extraction
is much more problem and domain dependent than classification, and thus requires
knowledge of the domain.
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Figure 3.2: Types of Features
3.1.2 Error Evaluation and Classification Accuracy
An important role in classification theory is played by error evaluation. Given a
labelled dataset, the most straightforward strategy for evaluating the performance
of a classification system is just counting the number of committed errors. Often,
the relative amount of errors is given, with respect to the total number of analysed
samples. Assume that a labelled data set Zts of size Nts is available for testing the
accuracy of our classifier, D. An estimation of the error is obtained by running D
on all the objects in Zts and find the proportion of misclassified objects
error(D) =
Nerror
Nts
To find out how the errors are distributed across the classes we construct a
confusion matrix using the testing data set, Zts. The entry eij of such a matrix
denotes the number of elements from Zts whose true class is Ci, and which are
assigned by D to class Cˆj . In table 3.2 a general confusion matrix for M classes
classification is shown.
In the case of one class classification, the problem of classification is simply
reduced to recognize whether a specific sample belongs to the considered class.
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Predicted Class
True Class Cˆ1 Cˆ2 . . . CˆM
C1 e11 e12 . . . e1M
C2 e21 e22 . . . e2M
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Cn eM1 en2 . . . eMM
Table 3.2: Confusion matrix for M classes classification
If this is not the case, the sample is simply not assigned to the class of interest.
The problem can be formally represented by naming two possible classification
outcomes, namely Positive and Negative, representing the only two possible op-
tions taken into account. In fact, in such a case, the occurrence of a particular
class is searched for. Anything outside such a class is tagged as Negative. The
corresponding confusion matrix is represented by table 3.3
Assigned Class
True Class Pˆ Nˆ
P TP FN
N FP TN
Table 3.3: Confusion matrix for one class classification
In such a case, the elements of the confusion matrix are named, respectively,
True Positives (TP), False Negatives (FN), False Positives (FP) and True Nega-
tives (TN). Such quantities can also be expressed as relative to the total amount of
patterns or samples belonging to either the class of interest, or not belonging to it.
3.1.3 Results Evaluation Methodologies
Suppose that we have a data set Z of size N , containing n-dimensional feature
vectors describing N objects. We would like to use as much data as possible to
build the classifier (training), and also as much unseen data as possible to test its
performance more thoroughly (testing). However, if we use all data for training
and the same data for testing, we might over-train the classifier so that it perfectly
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learns to classify the available data and fails on unseen data. That is why it is
important to have a separate data set on which to examine the final product. The
main alternatives for making the best use of Z can be summarized as follows:
• Resubstitution (R-method). Design classifier D on Z and test it on Z.
• Hold-out (H-method). Traditionally, split Z into halves, use one half for
training, and the other half for calculating PˆD. PˆD is pessimistically biased.
Splits in other proportions are also used. We can swap the two subsets, get
another estimate PˆD and average the two. A version of this method is the
data shuffle where we do L random splits of Z into training and testing parts
and average all L estimates of PˆD calculated on the respective testing parts.
• Cross-validation (called also the rotation method or p-method). We choose
an integer K (preferably a factor of N) and randomly divide Z into K sub-
sets of size N = K. Then we use one subset to test the performance of D
trained on the union of the remaining Kx1 subsets. This procedure is re-
peated K times, choosing a different part for testing each time. To get the
final value of PˆD we average the K estimates. When K = N , the method
is called the leave-one-out (or U-method).
• Bootstrap. This method is designed to correct the optimistic bias of the R-
method. This is done by randomly generating L sets of cardinality N from
the original set Z, with replacement. Then we assess and average the error
rate of the classifiers built on these sets.
3.1.4 Base Classifiers Taxonomy
Statistical Patter Recognition provides a variety of classifier models. A possible
taxonomy is shown in figure 3.3.
One solution is to try to estimate P (wi) and p(x|Ci), i = 1, . . . , c, from
Z and substitute the estimates Pˆ (Ci) and pˆ(x|Ci) in the discriminant functions
gi(x) = P (Ci)p(x|Ci), i = 1, . . . , c. This is called the plug-in approach to classi-
fier design. Approximating p(x|Ci) as a function of x divides classifier methods
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Figure 3.3: A Taxonomy of methods for classifier design
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into two big groups: parametric and non parametric. On the other side of the di-
agram there are classifier design methods that are not derived by approximating
the pdfs but rather by devising decision boundaries or discriminant functions em-
pirically. The distinction between the groups is not clear-cut. For example, radial
basis function(RBF) network from the group of structural approximation of the
discriminant functions can be moved to the group of functional approximation,
or even to the group of semi-parametric pdf modelling. Similarly, the k-nearest
neighbour (k-nn) method, although theoretically linked with nonparametric pdf
estimation, produces a direct estimate of the discriminant functions and can be
put under the heading of structural designs for approximating the discriminant
functions. There is no consensus on a single taxonomy, or even about the defi-
nition of parametric and nonparametric classifiers. Lippmann lists five types of
classifiers:
• probabilistic (LDC, QDC, Parzen);
• global (multilayer perceptron (MLP));
• local (radial basis function neural networks (RBF));
• nearest-neighbour type (k-nn, learning vector quantization neural networks
(LVQ));
• rule-forming (binary decision trees, rule-based systems).
Holmstrom et al. consider another grouping:
• classifiers based on density estimation:
– parametric (LDC, QDC);
– nonparametric (k-nn, kernel methods, finite mixtures, RBF).
• classifiers based on regression:
– parametric (linear regression, logistic regression, MLP);
– nonparametric (projection pursuit, additive models).
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• other classifiers (e.g., prototype-based: LVQ, k-nn for small k)
Some authors distinguish between neural and nonneural classifiers, local and
global classifiers, and so on.
3.2 Categorization of Combination Methods
Combination of multiple classifiers is a fascinating problem that can be consid-
ered from many prospectives, and combination techniques can be grouped and
analysed in different ways. In terms of implementation, a categorization of com-
bination methods can be made by considering the combination topologies or struc-
tures employed, as described in [65]. We could have different MCS depending on
[46]:
• Types of classifier outputs
– Type 1: The classifier produces only a label without any information
about the classification accuracy.
– Type 2: The classifier gives an ensemble of possible classes ranked in
order of importance.
– Type 3: The classifier gives a vector of scores associated to each pos-
sible class.
• Trainable or not-Trainable combiners.
• Topology.
Lu [53] categorizes MCS topologies into three categories: Cascading , Parallel
and Hierarchical.
In a cascading classifier, the classification result generated by a classifier is
used as an input to the next classifier. The results obtained through each classifier
are similarly passed onto the next classifier until a result is obtained through the
final classifier in the chain. The main disadvantage of the use of this methodology
is the inability of later classifiers to correct mistakes made by earlier classifiers.
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Parallel classifiers integrate the results of all classifiers in a singular location.
The main design decision that has to be made in the implementation of such a
configuration is the selection of a representative combination methodology. If the
decision process is well designed, the system can reach peak performance. Some
of the more popular and successful combinatorial methods include majority vot-
ing, belief integration and the “stacking until convergence” method. However, the
improper selection of a combinatorial strategy could accentuate the influence of
poorly performing classifiers, which could eventually adversely affect the overall
performance.
Hierarchical classifiers combine both parallel and cascading classifier con-
figurations to obtain optimal performance. The use of such a methodology can
compensate the disadvantages encountered through the use of a cascading integra-
tion. Hierarchical systems could also be used to introduce error checking, which
would nullify the influence of poorly performing classifiers.
A more comprehensive and topical categorization of multi-classifier topolo-
gies is presented in [48]. This categorization divides topologies into conditional,
hierarchical, hybrid and multiple-parallel topologies.
3.2.1 Conditional Topology
This strategy first selects one classifier to perform the task of classification. If this
classifier fails to correctly identify the presented data, another classifier is selected,
as shown in the figure 3.4. Most implementations include a primary classifier,
which is usually selected as the first classifier to be selected. The selection of
the next classifier can either be a static decision or maybe based on the values
obtained through the use of the primary classifier. Examples methods for dynamic
selection include decision trees. This process can continue for as long as there are
classifiers available or the pattern is correctly classified. If the primary classifier
is an efficient one, the process is computationally efficient. The queue of selected
classifiers could be organized in order for the computationally heavy classifiers to
be only selected at the end of the classifier queue. One difficult aspect of such an
implementation is the selection of a process by which the failures and successes of
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a classifier can be evaluated. This method can become overly complicated when
the number of available classifiers increases.
Figure 3.4: Conditional Topology Example
3.2.2 Hierarchical (Serial) Topology
This topology employs a method where classifiers are applied in succession. Each
classifier applied to the data is used to reduce the number of possible classes to
which such input data belongs to. As the data passes through the classifiers, the
decision becomes more and more focused. The common strategy for the design
of the classifier queue is to insert classifiers ordered according to decreasing error
values. That is to say the classifier with the highest error is used first, whereas the
classifier with the lowest error is used last. Of course, there should be safeguards
to ensure that the classes selected by each classifier always include the correct
class. If not, the next classifier will not have the option of selecting the correct
output class.
In the figure 3.5 we show an example of hierarchical topology where each
base classifier is a binary one, that can distinguish between the true class and all
the rest.
3.2.3 Multiple (Parallel) Topology
This is the most common implementation of a multi-classifier system. All the
classifiers first operate in parallel on the input and the results are then pooled to
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Figure 3.5: Hierarchical Topology Example
obtain a consensus result. This methodology does incur in a cost as it is computa-
tionally heavy, with each classifier having to be executed before the final result is
obtained.
Parallel combinations can be implemented using different strategies, and the
combination method depends on the types of information produced by the base
classifiers.
Figure 3.6: Parallel Topology Example
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3.2.4 Hybrid Topology
A hybrid topology based system incorporates a mechanism for the selection of the
best classifier for a given input. It is obvious that certain classifiers perform better
than others on certain data. Thus, the selection of an appropriate classifier would
streamline the entire classification process.
This topology could be considered a trade off between parallel and serial topol-
ogy, a possible example is shown in fig. 3.7. The major disadvantage of this ar-
chitecture is its complexity, even if we reach better performance with respect to
the others topologies.
Figure 3.7: Hybrid Topology Example
Hierarchical and multiple topologies are also known as selection-based and
fusion-based, respectively. The classification presented by [48] is more topical
and relevant than the one presented by [53] due to the consideration of hybrid
systems. Hybrid systems are rapidly gaining popularity among researchers due to
the limitations of each system.
3.3 The Combiners
The type of combiners that we can use depends on the base classifiers output. If
the base classifiers output is of Type 1, we can have different kind of combiners
as, for example:
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• Majority Voting
• Weighted Majority Voting
• Behaviour Knowledge Space
• Dempster-Shafer
3.3.1 Majority Voting
Dictatorship and majority vote are perhaps the two oldest strategies for decision
making. Their roots can be traced back to the era of ancient Greek city states
and the Roman Senate. The majority criterion became established in 1356 for the
election of German kings, by 1450 was adopted for elections to the British House
of Commons, and by 1500 as a rule to be followed in the House itself.
This combiner is based on a democratic method, even used in democratic
countries: the Vote. Each classifier gives its own evaluation; the final result will be
given from the class with more votes. In this case the combiner has to count only
the occurrences of each class, and evaluate which class has the greatest number of
votes.
If we want to formalize this concept, we can assume that the outputs of the
classifier will be denoted with a binary vector of sizeM , [di,1, . . . , di,c]T ∈ {0, 1}M , i =
{1, . . . B}, where B is the number of classifiers involved into the ensemble, M is
the number of the possible classes, and where di,j = 1 if the ith classifier votes
the class Cj for the actual sample, while di,j = 0 otherwise. So the system will
decide for the class Ck if :
B∑
i=1
di,k =
M
max
j=1
B∑
i=1
di,j(3.1)
That is to say if the number of votes obtained by the Ck class is the maximum
of the evaluation obtained from all the possible classes.
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3.3.2 Weighted Majority Voting
A variation of the previously described technique is the weighted majority voting.
In this case, for each classifier, we have also a weight. Obviously this weight will
be defined before the classification process. If we want to formalize this method,
we can consider the outputs of each classifier as in the previous method. In this
case we have to consider an other coefficient vector bi, that represents the weights
associated to the ith classifier. In this case Ck will be given as output class if:
B∑
i=1
bidi,k =
M
max
j=1
B∑
i=1
bidi,j(3.2)
It’s worth noting that if the weights bi are all the same, weighted majority
voting is exactly the same as majority voting.
A good way to choose the weights could be the following one, as demonstrated
in [46].
If we consider an ensemble of M independent classifiers, each of
them with an his own accuracy, pi, in which their accuracy will be
combined through the weighted majority voting. The accuracy of the
combination is maximized put the votes in accord with the following
method:
bi ∝ log pi
1− pi(3.3)
3.3.3 Bayesian Combination
The Bayesian Combination rule is based on the a posteriori probability. In fact,
to an input pattern x it will assign the class that maximizes such probability. If we
denote it as si(x), for the sake of simplicity, hereinafter the x will be ignored, the
output of the M classifiers involved into the ensemble, and with wk the generic
class. The combiner has to choose the class that maximize the quantity:
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p(wk|s1, s2, . . . , sM)(3.4)
This is the best combination method that we can use to reduce the error prob-
ability. The problem regards the knowledge of all the conditional probabilities for
the available classes. This information is often unknown. To overcome this prob-
lem, it’s possible to use some decision rules directly derived from the bayesian
formalism, that are an approximation of eq. 3.4
The principal combination rules are:
• Product Rule
• Sum rule
• Max rule
• Min rule
• Median rule
Product Rule
If we use the Bayes Rule it’s possible to rewrite eq. 3.4 as:
p(wk|s1, s2, . . . , sM) = p(wk)p(s1, s2, . . . , sM |wk)
p(s1, s2, . . . , sM)
(3.5)
It’s possible to rewrite the denominator as:
p(s1, s2, . . . , sM) =
N∑
l=1
p(s1, s2, . . . , sM |wl)p(wk)(3.6)
where N is the number of the possible classes. Now, if we assume that the
outputs of all the classifiers are conditionally independent, we can rewrite the
conditional probability as:
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p(s1, s2, . . . , sM |wk) =
M∏
i=1
p(si|wk)(3.7)
consequently eq. 3.5 becomes:
p(wk|s1, s2, . . . , sM) = p(wk)
−M+1
∏M
i=1 p(wk|si)∑N
l=1
∏M
i=1 p(si|wl)p(wk)
(3.8)
To maximize eq. 3.8, it’s necessary to maximize its numerator with respect to
k, that is:
max
k
{p(wk)−M+1
M∏
i=1
p(wk|si)}(3.9)
Eq. 3.9 represents the product rule. In fact we try to maximize the product of
the conditional probability of each classifier, with respect to all the classes. One
of the major problems of this technique is that it’s linked to the possibility that one
or more classifiers give a result close to zero. In this case, the product will give us
a value close to zero , and the combiner will fail.
Sum rule
To define the sum rule we have to make the hypothesis that all the a priori proba-
bilities and the a posteriori probabilities are very close each other:
p(wk|si) = p(wk)(1 + δi,j) with δi,j << 1(3.10)
After this we can substitute eq. 3.10 into eq. 3.9, and we can obtain:
p(wk)
−M+1
M∏
i=1
p(wk|si) = p(wk) = p(wk)
M∏
i=1
(1 + δi,j)(3.11)
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After that if we expand the second member product and we don’t consider the
second order terms, we obtain:
max
k
{(1−M)p(wk) +
M∑
i=1
p(wk|si)}(3.12)
Eq.3.12 represents the sum rule. The limit are in the initial hypothesis which
is very restrictive. That is true only in a very few cases.
Max rule
This rule is obtained directly from the sum rule, in fact it’s obtained as an approx-
imation of the sum with the maximum into the eq. 3.12
max
k
{(1−M)p(wk) +M Mmax
i=1
p(wk|si)}(3.13)
Min rule
This rule is obtained starting from eq. 3.9 with an approximation of the product
with the minimum.
max
k
{p(wk)−M+1
M
min
i=1
p(wk|si)}(3.14)
Median rule
Finally, the median rule is obtained starting from eq. 3.14, using the median in-
stead of the minimum:
max
k
{p(wk)−M+1medMi=1p(wk|si)}(3.15)
Obviously to use this rule it’s necessary that the hypothesis that the a priori
probabilities are the same is satisfied.
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3.3.4 The Dempster-Shafer approach
The theory of Dempster and Shafer (D-S theory) has been frequently applied to
deal with uncertainty management and incomplete reasoning.
In many applications, information is collected using several independent sources
and it is needed to integrate such pieces of information in order to improve the re-
liability of the decision making process. The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence,
is a framework for such purpose that has found applications in diverse areas such
as expert systems, accounting, robotics, medical imaging, documental retrieval,
computer vision, pattern matching. and automatic target recognition.
Differently from the classical Bayesian theory, D-S theory can explicitly model
the absence of information, while in case of absence of information a Bayesian ap-
proach attributes the same probability to all the possible events.
The DempsterShafer theory could narrow down a hypothesis set with the accu-
mulation of evidence and it allows for a representation of the ignorance due to
the uncertainty in the evidence. When the ignorance reaches the value zero, the
DempsterShafer model reduces to the standard Bayesian model. Thus, the Demp-
sterShafer theory could be considered as a generalization of the theory of proba-
bility.
Some theoretical issues
Let θ be a finite, non-empty set consisting of all the possible values of a certain
attribute. The set θ serves as our universal set, and it is called the frame of discern-
ment. A mass function, also called basic probability assignment, is a mapping m
from the set of all subsets of θ into the closed interval [0, 1] such that
m(∅) = 0
∑
A⊆2θ
m(A) = 1(3.16)
The function value m(A) measures the degree of evidence that is assigned to
the subset and (1) reflects that the total evidence is one. The simplest mass func-
tion corresponds to the case when there is no available evidence at all (i.e.,total
ignorance), in this case we set m(θ) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for all other subsets of θ.
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When assigning a bpa, there are some requirements which have to be met.
They descend from the fact that the bpa is still a probability function, hence has
to respect the constraints for mass probability functions. Each bpa is such that
m : 2θ → [0, 1], where θ indicates the so called frame of discernment. Usu-
ally, the frame of discernment θ consists of M mutually exclusive and exhaustive
hypotheses Ai, i = 1, . . . ,M . A subset {Ai, . . . , Aj} ⊆ θ represents a new hy-
pothesis. As the number of possible subsets of θ is 2θ, the generic hypothesis is
an element of 2θ.
For example, if we only consider two hypotheses (classes), namely Positive(P)
and Negative(N); hence, the frame of discernment is θ = {{P}, {N}} and 2θ =
{{P}, {N}, {P,N}}, whereas in the Bayesian case only the events {{P}, {N}}
would be considered.
{P} and {N} are referred to as simple events or singletons, while {P , N} is
referred to as composite event. Furthermore, also the following properties have to
hold:
m(∅) = 0
∑
A⊆2θ
m(A) = 1
The aim of assigning a bpa is to describe the reliability of a particular classifier in
reporting a specific event. Such a representation is suitable for combination, but
as we want to deal with combined results in the same way, we also impose the
constraint that the combination of several bpa by means of the D-S rule still has
to be a bpa. The uncertainty in the final decision will be inversely proportional
to the extent to which the base classifiers agree. If we have n base classifiers, the
combination rule is such that:
m(A) = K
∑
Tn
i=1 Ai=A
n∏
i=1
mi(Ai)
where:
K−1 = 1−
∑
Tn
i=1 Ai=∅
n∏
i=1
mi(Ai)
=
∑
Tn
i=1 Ai 6=∅
n∏
i=1
mi(Ai)
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It is worth observing that the normalizing factor K is independent from any
specific value of A. The value K can therefore be considered a constant, once the
bpas are fixed.
3.4 Well Known MCS Approaches
There is no definitive taxonomy. Jain, Duin and Mao (2000) list eighteen classi-
fier combination schemes; Witten and Frank (2000) detail four methods of com-
bining multiple models: bagging, boosting, stacking and error-correcting output
codes whilst Alpaydin (2004) covers seven methods of combining multiple learn-
ers: voting, error-correcting output codes, bagging, boosting, mixtures of experts,
stacked generalization and cascading. Here, the literature in general is reviewed,
with, where possible, an emphasis on both theoretical and practical advices, then
the taxonomy from Jain, Duin and Mao (2000) is provided, and finally four ensem-
ble methods are focussed on: bagging, boosting (including AdaBoost), stacked
generalization and the random subspace method.
Table 3.4 provides a taxonomy of ensemble methods which was taken from
Jain, Duin and Mao (2000).
3.4.1 Boosting
Boosting was inspired by an on-line learning algorithm called Hedge(β). This
algorithm allocates weights to a set of strategies used to predict the outcome of a
certain event.The weight of strategy si, if properly scaled, can be interpreted as
the probability that si is the best (most accurate) predicting strategy in the group.
The distribution is updated on-line after each outcome. Strategies with the correct
prediction receive more weight while the weights of the strategies with incorrect
predictions are reduced.
Boosting is related to the general problem of producing a very accurate pre-
diction rule by combining rough and moderately inaccurate rules-of-thumb.The
general boosting idea is to develop the classifier team D incrementally, adding
one classifier at a time. The classifier that joins the ensemble at step k is trained
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Scheme Architecture Trainable Adaptive Info-level Comments
Voting Parallel No No Abstract Assumes indepen-
dent classifiers
Sum,
mean,
median
Parallel No No Confidence Robust; Assumes
independent confi-
dence estimators
Product,
min, max
Parallel No No Confidence Assumes indepen-
dent features
Generalized
ensemble
Parallel Yes No Confidence Considers error cor-
relation
Adaptive
weighting
Parallel Yes Yes Confidence Explores local exper-
tise
Stacking Parallel Yes No confidence Good utilization of
training data
Borda
count
Parallel Yes No Rank Converts ranks into
confidences
Logistic re-
gression
Parallel Yes No Rank confi-
dence
Converts ranks into
confidences
Class set
reduction
Parallel cas-
cading
Yes/No No Rank confi-
dence
Efficient
Dempster-
Shafer
Parallel Yes No Confidence Fuses non-
probabilistic confi-
dences
Fuzzy inte-
grals
Parallel Yes No confidence Fuses non -
probabilistic confi-
dences
Mixture
of local
experts
(MLE)
Gated paral-
lel
Yes Yes Confidence Explores local exper-
tise; joint optimiza-
tion
Hierarchical
MLE
Gated paral-
lel hierarchi-
cal
Yes Yes Confidence Same as MLE; hier-
archical
Associative
switch
Parallel Yes Yes Abstract Same as MLE, but
non joint optimiza-
tion
Bagging Parallel Yes No confidence Needs many compa-
rable classifiers
Boosting Parallel hier-
archical
Yes No Abstract Improves margins;
unlikely to over-
train , sensitive to
mislabels; needs
many comparable
classifiers
Random
subspace
Parallel Yes No Confidence Needs many compa-
rable classifiers
Neural
trees
Hierarchical Yes No confidence Handles large num-
bers of classes
Table 3.4: Ensemble Methods
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on a data set selectively sampled from the training data set Z. The sampling dis-
tribution starts from uniform, and progresses towards increasing the likelihood of
“difficult” data points. Thus the distribution is updated at each step, increasing the
likelihood of the objects misclassified at step k − 1.
The classifiers in D are the trials or events, and the data points in Z are the
strategies whose probability distribution we update at each step. The algorithm
is called AdaBoost which comes from ADAptative BOOSTing. There are two
implementation of AdaBoost: with reweighting and with resampling.
AdaBoost
AdaBoost is one of the best-known and best-performing ensemble classifier learn-
ing algorithms. It constructs a sequence of base models, where each model is con-
structed based on the performance of the previous model on the training set. In
particular, AdaBoost calls the base model learning algorithm with a training set
weighted by a distribution. After the base model is created, it is tested on the
training set to see how well it learned.
The figure 3.4.1 shows AdaBoost’s pseudocode. AdaBoost constructs a se-
quence of base models ht for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, where each model is constructed
based on the performance of the previous base model on the training set. In par-
ticular, AdaBoost maintains a distribution over the m training examples. The
distribution d1 used in creating the first base model gives equal weight to each ex-
ample (d1,i = 1/m ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}). AdaBoost now enters the loop, where the
base model learning algorithm Lb is called with the training set and d1 . The re-
turned model h1 is then tested on the training set to see how well it learned. The
total weight of the misclassified examples (ǫ1) is calculated. The weights of the
correctly-classified examples are multiplied by ǫ1/(1ǫ1) so that they have the same
total weight as the misclassified examples. The weights of all the examples are
then normalized so that they sum to 1 instead of 2ǫ1. AdaBoost assumes that Lb is
a weak learner, i.e., ǫt < 1/2 with high probability. Under this assumption, the to-
tal weight of the misclassified examples ǫt < 1/2 is increased to 1/2 and the total
weight of the correctly classified examples 1ǫt > 1/2 is decreased to 1/2. This is
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AdaBoost((x1 , y1 ), . . . , (xm , ym),Lb , T )
Initialize d1,i = 1m ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . .m}.
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
ht = Lb({(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)},dt)
Calculate the error of ht : ǫt =
∑
i:ht(xi)6=yi
dt,i
if (ǫt ≥ 1/2) then,
set T = t− 1 and abort this loop.
βt =
ǫt
1−ǫt
Calculate distribution dt+1:
wi = dt,i ×
{
βt, ifht(xi) = yi
1, otherwise
dt+1,i =
wiPm
i=1 wi
return the final hypothesis:
hfin(x) = argmaxy∈Y
∑
t:ht(x)=y
log 1
βt
Figure 3.8: AdaBoost algorithm
done so that, by the weak learning assumption, the next model ht+1 will classify
at least some of the previously misclassified examples correctly. Returning to the
algorithm, the loop continues, creating the T base models in the ensemble. The fi-
nal ensemble returns, for a new example, the one class in the set of classes Y that
gets the highest weighted vote from the base models. Each base models vote is
proportional to its accuracy on the weighted training set used to train it.
3.4.2 Bagging
Bagging is introduced by (Breiman 1996) as an acronym for Bootstrap AGGre-
gatING. The idea of bagging is simple and appealing: the ensemble is made of
classifiers built on bootstrap replicates of the training set. The classifier outputs
are combined by the plurality vote. The meta-algorithm, which is a special case of
model averaging, was originally designed for classification and is usually applied
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to decision tree models, but it can be used with any type of model for classifica-
tion or regression. The method uses multiple versions of a training set by using
the bootstrap, i.e. sampling with replacement. Each of these data sets is used to
train a different model. The outputs of the models are combined by averaging (in
the case of regression) or voting (in the case of classification) to create a single
output.
Bagging is only effective when using unstable (i.e. a small change in the
training set can cause a significant change in the model) non-linear models.
3.4.3 Stacked Generalization
Stacked generalization (or stacking) (Wolpert 1992) is a different way of com-
bining multiple models, that introduces the concept of a meta learner. Although
an attractive idea, it is less widely used than bagging and boosting. Unlike bag-
ging and boosting, stacking may be (and normally is) used to combine models of
different types. The procedure is as follows:
1. Split the training set into two disjoint sets.
2. Train several base learners on the first part.
3. Test the base learners on the second part.
4. Using the predictions from 3) as the inputs, and the correct responses as the
outputs, train a higher level learner.
Note that steps 1) to 3) are the same as cross-validation, but instead of using a
winner-takes-all approach, the base learners are combined, possibly non-linearly.
3.4.4 Random Subspace Method
The random subspace method (RSM) (Ho 1998) is a relatively recent method
of combining models. Learning machines are trained on randomly chosen sub-
spaces of the original input space (i.e. the training set is sampled in the feature
space). The outputs of the models are then combined, usually by a simple majority
vote.
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3.5 Some Considerations
In conclusion, real-life situations are not as simple and straightforward. Most
data sets are not of good quality and contain a substantial quantity of noise. Such
erroneous data can mislead the training paradigm which can lead to wrong ap-
proximations. Secondly, most training paradigms have very clear-cut limitations
on their operation. For example, the rule of thumb for the proper training of a
neural network is that the paradigm should be presented with at least 10 times as
much data as there are connections within the network. Less data can lead to the
neural network reaching global minimums in its training error and consequently,
returning bad approximations on the function. A small sized neural network with
2-3 hidden layers and 10 inputs will have at least 50 connections, which in turn
leads to a requirement of at least 500 training samples for proper training. Most
of the complex data sets currently being used are often of much higher dimen-
sions and consequently require large networks for proper approximations. This
in turn leads to the requirement of needing large data sets, which is often left
unfulfilled. Due to the limitations mentioned above, it has been experimentally
observed that the construction of a perfect classifier for any given task is often im-
possible. Therefore, the best that system designers have to work with are classi-
fiers and paradigms which provide near approximations of the functions expected.
Of course, when different paradigms are used to approximate the same function,
the approximations generated can vary due to different interpretations of the data
and noise being made. This diversity among different learning paradigms had
lead to the development of the Multi-Classifier System (MCS), which attempts to
combine the approximations of different training paradigms to obtain better re-
sults. Such systems are analogous to a company board of directors, where the
board is usually constituted of people who have varying levels of qualifications
and expertise. For example, a board is usually constituted of an economist, an ac-
countant, a management consultant and a marketing consultant. It is very rare that
a board will have one person who is specialized in all these fields of expertise, and
are therefore compelled to make decisions in consensus with all the members of
the board. A decision making process of this sort, where the final decision is gen-
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erated by combining the opinions of all the members of the board is exactly how a
MCS works. Of course, there can be many variations to this theme, where differ-
ent members of the board could be given extra decision making capabilities based
on the type of decision to be made. Intuitively, it makes sense that a combination
classifiers or experts provides better results than a singular decision maker. How-
ever, this is dependent on how independent and diverse the individual classifiers
are. If all the classifiers provide similar and correlated results, the aggregated re-
sult will not provide any improvement to the recognition process. Accordingly,
the diversity among the selected classifiers has been recognized as one of the key
design features within a successful multi-classifier.
Chapter 4
Self-Organizing Classifier ensemble
for Adversarial Learning
In supervised classification we cannot work without labels that can be associated
with our training data. Obtaining labels, hard or soft, is a process prone to er-
rors. That means that a classification algorithm can have falsely labelled data in
its training set, and this, in extreme cases, might render it useless. Sometimes
the mislabelling samples could be forced by a training set contamination made by
some malicious users (Adversarial Learning). This kind of training set contami-
nation is also known as Poisoning Attack [1].
In this chapter we deal with to find out what is the impact of noise-contaminations
on the labels, and how it is possible to clean a training set with a MCS approach.
We will describe this kind of approach, named SOCIAL, and we made several
experiments to verify the robustness to the noise and to the contamination (smart-
noise) of a classifier trained with a cleaned training set.
We will show that the performance obtained by a simple classifier trained with
the cleaned training set and by some “state-of-the-art” MCS trained on the original
dataset, are comparable and sometimes the simple classifier is even better in terms
of accuracy.
We will demonstrate that our system can move the computational complexity
from the classification system to the training set cleaning system, giving advan-
tages in terms of computational complexity, interpretation of the problem (for
example through a set of rules) robustness in case of adversarial learning prob-
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lems.
4.1 Some MCS approach for Label Noise
There is not much literature on how noise label should be modelled and dealt with
an MCS approach.
AdaBoost [30] has shown to often improve the base learner accuracy. Since
its introduction, it has been successfully applied to many problems. Furthermore,
the AdaBoost idea has been extended to other sort of problems. Although it has
wide-spread success, it is susceptible to the over-fitting problem as pointed out
by Dietterich [21]. Oza [61] proposed an approach called AveBoost2 to smooth
noise. This approach can be seen as a relaxed version of AdaBoost. When training
examples are noisy and therefore difficult to fit, AdaBoost is known to increase
the weights of those examples to excess and over-fit them because many consec-
utive base models may not learn them properly. AveBoost2s averaging does not
allow the weights of noisy examples to increase rapidly, thereby mitigating the
overfitting problem.
Thiel [73] made a comparison between the single classifier and an ensemble.
In his paper the attention is focused on which impact a dataset with soft labels has
on a noisy training set.
Melville and Mooney [57] introduced a new kind of multiple classifier sys-
tem to take into account the noise label problem; they called it DECORATE.
DECORATE, (Diverse Ensemble Creation by Oppositional Relabelling of Ar-
tificial Training Examples) uses an existing ”strong” learner (one that provides
high accuracy on the training data) to build an effective diverse committee in a
fairly simple, straightforward manner. This is accomplished by adding different
randomly constructed examples to the training set when building new committee
members. These artificially constructed examples are given category labels that
disagree with the current decision of the committee, thereby easily and directly
increasing diversity when a new classifier is trained on the augmented data and
added to the committee.
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4.2 The SOCIAL Approach
SOCIAL is the acronym of Self-Organizing ClassIfier ensemble for Adversarial
Learning and is a Multiple Classifier Systems with a parallel topology (sec 3.2.3)
where a statistical characterization of each base classifiers is dynamically updated
by looking at the ensemble of these classifiers.
This system, after an iterative evolution, returns a cleaned training set. This
result is obtained changing the labels assigned to the samples and considering the
training set cleaned when these changes become stable.
SOCIAL is specifically designed to approach with training sets with noisy
labels, i.e. for an adversarial leaning problem. The principle behind is that a
community through a democratic approach can remove most of its own initial
mistakes and so it can improve itself.
4.2.1 System Evolution and Terminal Condition
The main parameter used here is the Degree of Truth, hereinafter DoT1. This
value is defined in the range [0, 1] and it represents the probability that the labels
assigned to the sample are corrects.
The DoT distribution requires to be initialized. Making the assumption that
the noise distribution is unknown, a possible criteria is to assign 1 to the DoT
for each sample. This means that we trust the labels assigned to the training set
samples.
Another important parameter is the Classifier Reliability, hereinafter R. This
parameter is associated to all the base classifiers and it represents a degree of belief
on the correctness of the classifier with respect to the ensemble decisions.
The last important parameter is δdB , that is the value used for the terminal
condition. This value is calculated as the ratio (in decibel) between the number of
the samples that change their labels across two consecutive steps.
1The concept of DoT is often used in the context of fuzzy theory [69], in this case, statements
are described in terms of membership functions, that are continuous and have a range [0, 1]. For
example, given the measured value of a parameter, the membership function gives the degree of
truth that the parameter is “high” or “low”.
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The system behaviour is characterized by:
1. a bootstrap step, in which SOCIAL put the DoT = 1 for each sample and
δdB = +∞
2. an iterative evolution, in which the R associated to each base classifier is
upgraded and the base classifiers are combined to redefine the DoT and the
label for each sample.
3. a terminal condition, in which there is a comparison between δ and a suit-
able threshold (τ ).
In figure 4.1 the system evolution is represented. After the bootstrap phase, the
system, iteratively, makes a base classifier statistical characterization and then
combines all the classifiers’ outputs weighted by their performance estimation
in order to evaluate if the label of samples must change. Finally, the terminal
condition is checked and, if it is matched, the system returns a “cleaned” training
set as well as the R for each classifier.
Figure 4.1: SOCIAL: Flow Diagram
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4.2.2 Base Classifiers Statistical Characterization
All the information about the performance of a classifier with respect to a spe-
cific training set are given by the Confusion Matrix (sec 3.1.2). It represents how
the errors are distributed across the classes. Starting from this matrix we have in-
troduced a new type of matrix, that takes into account also the probability that a
training pattern really belongs to a specific class. We called this matrix Weighted
Confusion Matrix, hereinafter WCM.
Predicted Class
True Class Cˆ1 Cˆ2 . . . CˆM
C1 e11 e12 . . . e1M
C2 e21 e22 . . . e2M
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
CM eM1 eM2 . . . eMM
Table 4.1: Confusion Matrix (CM) for M-classes classification
In table 4.1 a general Confusion Matrix for an M-classes problem is shown.
Let us define the training set as {(x1, y1), . . . , (xN , yN)}, where the generic
xk is the k-th sample and yk is its label. Ni represents the number of samples in
which y = Ci, and Nij represents the number of samples in which y = Ci and
yˆ = Cj, where yˆ is the predicted label.
The difference between the Confusion Matrix and the weighted version WCM
lies on how the elements eij are calculated. While in the Confusion Matrix the en-
try eij denotes the percentage of training set samples whose true class is Ci, and
which are assigned by the classifier to class Cˆj, (eq. 4.1), in the Weighted Confu-
sion Matrix the same entry denotes the percentage of the training set whose true
class is Ci, and which are assigned by the classifier to class Cˆj, weighted by the
DoT associated to each sample (eq. 4.2).
CM eij =
Nij
Ni
=
∑N
k=1:yk=Ci and yˆk=Cˆj
1
Ni
,(4.1)
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Sample True Class DoT Predicted Class
x1 P 0.8 N
x2 P 0.6 P
x3 P 0.9 P
x4 N 0.2 N
x5 N 0.5 P
x6 P 0.7 P
x7 N 0.4 N
x8 N 0.9 N
x9 P 0.3 P
x10 N 0.2 P
Table 4.2: Training Set Classification Example with DoT value
WCM eij =
∑N
k=1:yk=Ci and yˆk=Cˆj
DoT (k)
Ni
,(4.2)
For example, we can consider the binary classification problem in the table 4.2.
In this case the samples can belong to the classes Positive (P) or Negative (N)
and the entry eij are evaluated as shown in the table 4.3. It is worth noting that the
sum of the elements of each WCM row is always less than one, while in the case
of CM it is always one. This is due to the DoT associated to each sample.
For the sake of brevity, in the following we explicitly evaluate only the entry
e00 of the matrix, that is, when the True Class is P and the Assigned Class is Pˆ .
CM e00 =
4
5
= 0.8(4.3)
WCM e00 =
0.6 + 0.9 + 0.7 + 0.3
5
= 0.46(4.4)
Starting from the WCM, SOCIAL evaluates the Classifier Reliability R as-
sociated to each base classifier.
r : WCM −→ R(4.5)
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CM Predicted Class
True Class Pˆ Nˆ
P 0.80 0.20
N 0.40 0.60
WCM Predicted Class
True Class Pˆ Nˆ
P 0.46 0.16
N 0.14 0.30
Table 4.3: Comparison between CM and WCM on the example in tab 4.2
It is possible to make a comparison between the Probability Theory and this
problem. The WCM could be considered as a probability density function (pdf )
while the R could be considered as a synthetic information extracted from the
pdf , as for examples the mean (µ) or the standard deviation (σ).
The information that SOCIAL has to extract from the WCM depends on
which type of fusion it uses. For example, if the fusion block is a Weighted
Majority Voting (sec 3.3.2) then the R will be a vector of “weights” associated
to each class, where the single value R(Ci) is evaluated as shown in eq. 4.6.
R(Ci) = eii, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,M(4.6)
Another examples of function r() will be described in the appendix A where
the Dempster-Shafer (sec 3.3.4) combination rule is used as fusion block, and in
the appendix B, where the Bayesian Combing rule is considered.
In figure 4.2 it is shown how the system evaluates the WCM starting from the
training set. It is worth nothing that in the bootstrap phase the Weighted Confusion
Matrix is the normal Confusion Matrix, because the DoT value are put to 1 for
each sample.
Another important consideration is that the name SOCIAL directly derives
from the DoT values that are evaluated from the ensemble in the previous step,
that’s why the classifier characterization is made with respect to the others classi-
fiers.
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Figure 4.2: Statistical Classifier Characterization Schema
4.2.3 Base Classifiers Combination
After the system has characterized the base classifiers, it has to combine them to
obtain the new label and the new DoT for each sample as shown in the figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Base Classifiers Combination
The Fusion Block implements a function f() defined as:
f : ((yˆ1, R1), . . . , (yˆB, RB)) −→ (y,DoT )(4.7)
Where in eq. 4.7 yˆi represents the output of the i− th classifier by means of a
suitable combining rule.
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For example, in the case of using the Weighted Majority Voting (sec 3.3.2) as
combining rule, f() becomes:
f −→


y = argmax j
PB
i=1:yˆi=Cj
Ri(yˆi)
B
DoT = max j
PB
i=1:yˆi=Cj
Ri(yˆi)
B
(4.8)
Other examples of f() will be discussed into the Appendix A and in the Ap-
pendix B.
4.2.4 Label Changes Evaluation and Terminal Condition
SOCIAL stops its iterations when the ratio δdB between the samples that change
their labels in the step t − 1 and that ones that change them in the step t is less
than a threshold τ (eq. 4.10) and it will give the cleaned dataset.
changes(t) =
N∑
i=1
∆i, ∆i =
{
1, if yi(t− 1) 6= yi(t)
0, otherwise
(4.9)
δdB =
{
+∞, t = 1
10 ∗ log10 changes(t−1)change(t) , Otherwise
(4.10)
We have experimentally proved that a good value for τ is 1dB. It is worth
noting that during the first step δ = +∞ and so the system can stop its iterations
only starting from the second step.
4.2.5 The SOCIAL Algorithm
In this section we will describe the SOCIAL algorithm using the Weighted Ma-
jority Voting as fusion block.
Fig. 4.2.5 shows the pseudocode of the algorithm. SOCIAL has as input
the training set (x1, y1(1), . . . , (xN , yN(1)), the base models learning algorithms
L1, . . . , LB and a threshold value τ for the terminal condition.
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This algorithm, for each step t, maintains a distribution DoT (t), where each
element DoTi(t) is associated to the sample xi. This distribution gives the prob-
ability that the sample xi really belongs to the class yi. During the bootstrap
phase, (DoTi(1) = 1 ∀i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , N) for the motivations illustrated previ-
ously (sec 4.2.1).
As first operation, SOCIAL evaluates through a K-Fold Cross Validation ap-
proach, a function hb(t) that associates for each sample xi, for each base classifier
b and for each step t, a predicted class yˆbi (t). Starting from yˆbi (t), SOCIAL evalu-
ates the WCM (sec. 4.2.2), where each entry is calculated as:
ebij(t) =
∑N
k=1:yk(t)=Ci and yˆ
b
k
(t)=Cj
DoTk(t)
Ni
(4.11)
Consequently, it evaluates the Classifier Reliability Rb(t) for each base classi-
fier b and for each iteration t. The values Rb(Ci, t) are evaluated for each possible
class Ci starting from the weighted confusion matrix and calculating the weighted
accuracy for each class:
Rb(Ci, t) = e
b
ii(t)(4.12)
After the weights evaluation, it applies the WMV to each sample and updates
the label yi(t) into the training set and the DoT (t) distribution:
yi(t+ 1) = argmax j
∑B
k=1:yˆki (t)=Cj
Rk(yˆki (t))
B
DoTi(t+ 1) = max
j
∑B
k=1:yˆki (t)=Cj
Rk(yˆki (t))
B
At this point SOCIAL evaluates the number of samples that change their labels
in the step t:
changes(t) =
N∑
i=1
∆i, ∆i =
{
1, if yi(t− 1) 6= yi(t)
0, otherwise
(4.13)
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At the end, it evaluates the terminal condition, i.e. if the
10 ∗ log10
changes(t− 1)
change(t)
< τ
SOCIAL returns the cleaned training set (x1 , y1 (t)), . . . , (xN , yN (t)).
4.3 Experimental Results
To figure out how the system perform, we will show the results obtained for two
kinds of problems, the first one produced with some synthetic distributions in
which noise is added as described in the section 4.3.1, and another with some real
scenarios in which the noise is added in a smart manner, i.e. imitating a possible
malicious user that try to overcame the security system contaminating the training
set. In all the tests we will make a comparison among the accuracy obtained
through the worst base classifier trained with the training set cleaned by SOCIAL
and the accuracy obtained by all the base classifiers and by the state of the art
Multiple Classifier Systems on the original training set.
4.3.1 Noise Model
To experimentally determine the impact of label noise on classification accuracy,
we need to artificially add noise according to a certain model. In a two-class case,
a given portion of the training data would get randomly selected and the associated
label flipped to the opposite class. This method can be extended to the multi-class
case, with the label being changed to one of the other classes in a random manner.
4.3.2 Results with Synthetic Data
The first type of experiments are on three synthetic datasets reported in table 4.4.
We have considered three base classifiers:
• Decision Tree (DT): The algorithms that are used for constructing decision
trees work by choosing a variable at each step that is the next best variable
to use in splitting the set of items. Best is defined by how well the variable
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SOCIAL((x1 , y1 (1 )), . . . , (xN , yN (1 )),L1 , . . . ,LB , τ)
 N is the number of samples, B is the number of base classifiers,
 τ is terminal condition threshold, M is the number of the classes.
Initialize DoTi(1) = 1 ∀i ∈ 1, 2, . . . N .
Initialize t = 0
Initialize δ = +∞
do
t = t+ 1
for b = 1, 2, . . . , B,
 Classifier evaluation through a K-fold Cross Validation Approach:
h
b(t) = Lb((x1, y1(t)), . . . , (xM , yM (t)))
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
for j = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
 WCM entries evaluation
ebij(t) =
PN
k=1:yk(t)=Ci and yˆ
b
k
(t)=Cj
DoTk(t)
Ni
 Classifier Reliability calculation:
Rb(Ci, t) = e
b
ii(t)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
 Label yi updating in the training set:
yi(t+ 1) = argmax j
PB
k=1:yˆk
i
(t)=Cj
Rk(yˆki (t))
B
 DoT updating for each sample:
DoTi(t+ 1) = maxj
PB
k=1:yˆk
i
(t)=Cj
Rk(yˆki (t))
B
 Label changes evaluation:
changes(t) =
∑N
i=1 ∆i, ∆i =
{
1, if yi(t− 1) = yi(t)
0, otherwise
 Terminal condition evaluation:
if t > 1,
δ = 10 ∗ log10 changes(t−1)changes(t)
while δ > τ
return The cleaned training set (x1 , y1 (t)), . . . , (xN , yN (t)).
Figure 4.4: The SOCIAL Algorithm
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Figure 4.5: The noise generator algorithm.
Distribution Training Set Samples Test Set Samples Classes
Gaussian 4000 1000 2
Mixture of Gaussians 4000 1000 2
Rotated Check Board (45◦) 4000 1000 2
Table 4.4: Synthetic Datasets Description
splits the set into subsets that have the same value of the target variable.
Different algorithms use different formulae for measuring best. We used
the C4.5 Algorithm, in particular the J48 implementation of Weka [28]
• Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN): The Probabilistic Neural Network
was introduced in 1990 by Specht [70] and puts the statistical kernel estima-
tor into the framework of radial basis function networks. PNNs have gained
interest because they offer a way to interpret the network structure in the
form of a probability density function.
• K Nearest Neighbourhood (KNN) with k = 3: The k-nearest neighbour
algorithm is amongst the simplest of all machine learning algorithms: an
object is classified by a majority vote of its neighbours, with the object
being assigned to the class most common amongst its k nearest neighbours
(k is a positive integer, typically small). If k = 1, then the object is simply
assigned to the class of its nearest neighbour.
We choose these classifiers because they are conceptually different and they
can increase the diversity among them. It is experimentally demonstrate that for a
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Multiple Classifier Systems the diversity of the base classifiers is very important
to increase the overall performance [46].
In order to compare, we choose four well known MCS approaches (sec 3.4);
in particular:
• DECORATE: Diverse Ensemble Creation by Oppositional Relabelling of
Artificial Training Examples which uses an existing ”strong” learner (one
that provides high accuracy on the training data) to build an effective diverse
committee in a fairly simple, straightforward manner.
• ADABOOST: ADAptive BOOSTing, a machine learning algorithm, for-
mulated by Yoav Freund and Robert Schapire. It is a meta-algorithm, and
can be used in conjunction with many other learning algorithms to improve
their performance. AdaBoost is adaptive in the sense that subsequent classi-
fiers built are tweaked in favour of those instances misclassified by previous
classifiers. AdaBoost is sensitive to noisy data and outliers. However it is
less susceptible to the over-fitting problem than most learning algorithms.
• MULTIBOOST: MULTI class adaBOOST, that is an efficient implemen-
tation of the ADABOOST, with the possibility to consider multi-class prob-
lems.
• BAGGING: Bootstrap AGGregatING, a machine learning ensemble meta-
algorithm to improve classification and regression models in terms of stabil-
ity and classification accuracy. It also reduces variance and helps to avoid
over-fitting. Although it is usually applied to decision tree models, it can be
used with any type of model.
General system evaluation with 30% of noise label
The first test is made using the three different synthetic distributions adding a 30%
of uniformly distributed noise to them.
In table 4.5, the first four rows represent the accuracy obtained with the Mul-
tiple Classifier System trained with the original training set corrupted by a 30%
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Gaussian Mixture of Gaussians Rotated Check Board
Multi Classifiers System
ADABoost 95, 70% 80, 60% 74, 10%
MultiBoost 95, 70% 78, 60% 72, 30%
Decorate 96, 60% 82, 00% 84, 20%
Bagging 96, 40% 79, 60% 89, 40%
Base Classifiers
Decision Tree 80, 40% 68, 40% 70, 00%
KNN 86, 30% 71, 00% 71, 00%
PNN 92, 60% 75, 80% 75, 80%
Decision Tree trained with the obtained clean Dataset
Decision Tree* 97, 10% 82, 40% 91, 00%
Table 4.5: Synthetic results with 30% of label noise on the training set
of label noise, the successive three rows represent the accuracy obtained with the
three base classifiers trained on the original training set. Finally, the last row rep-
resents the accuracy obtained with the worst base classifier, in this case the DT,
trained with the training set cleaned by SOCIAL.
It is worth noting that SOCIAL makes the classification problem simpler than
the original one, and even the worst classifier trained with the cleaned training set
becomes better, in terms of accuracy, than all the MCSs approaches used and as
well as all the base classifiers.
In the figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 is shown how SOCIAL modifies the training
set, and how the δ parameter changes, for the three considered datasets.
In particular in each one of them, the first picture represents the accuracy be-
haviour across the steps. It is worth noting that the behaviour is always the same
for each of the three datasets, i.e. there is a first moment in which the accuracy
improves, and it corresponds to an effective cleaning of the training set, and a sec-
ond moment, in which the accuracy decreases; it corresponds to a smoothing of
the original distribution and a loosing of some information contained in.
It is possible to find the same information in the second picture in which differ-
ent values of δdB are represented across the steps. In this case we are monitoring
the variation between two consecutive steps. The value is in dB, so that if there
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isn’t any variations between two consecutive steps, we have a value equal to 0. We
experimentally noticed that if we did not want to compromise the initial distribu-
tion, and want to preserve most of the information contained in it, a good value
for the threshold τ is 1dB. In this picture the violet dot-line represent an inter-
polation among three consecutive points of the δdB line, i.e the blue one, this is
due to the fact that sometimes the original line, especially with low level of noise,
becomes unstable, and it is difficult to find the correct output step.
The other ten pictures represent a scatterplot of the distribution in each step.
The output step is indicated in bold, i.e. the scatterplot of the cleaned training set.
In the table 4.5 are shown the results obtained. It’s worth nothing that the De-
cision Tree trained with the cleaned training set by SOCIAL, always increases the
performance of the base classifiers, and, the cleaned training set shows a classi-
fication problem simpler than the original one, as demonstrated by the fact that
the worst base classifier (DT) obtains an high level of accuracy using the cleaned
training set.
Some Considerations
For the sake of brevity we presented only some tests on the rotated check board
dataset to make some considerations that seems to be valid in general.
The first test arise with the evaluation of the SOCIAL robustness to the noise.
In this case we added a different percentage of noise to the training set, and we
evaluate the accuracy of the DT and the other MCS approaches under test (fig-
ure 4.6).
In the figure 4.7 it is shown a comparison among the base classifiers accuracy
and the accuracy obtained a Decision Tree trained with the clean training set. Also
in this case it’s clear that the system is more robust to the noise with respect to the
single classifiers.
Another important result is that the system reaches to recognize if the training
set is noisy or not. In the figure 4.8 is shown the percentage of the samples that
change their labels in the first iteration with respect to the number of training set
samples. This percentage is linear dependent to the percentage of added noise.
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Figure 4.6: Accuracy Comparison with MCS for different % of noise
Figure 4.7: Accuracy Comparison with base Classifiers for different % of noise
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Figure 4.8: % Class changes in the 1st step for different % of noise
4.3.3 Results with real data
We made also two case studies with real data, in particular, in the first one we used
some internet packets traces, where the classes were attack or normal, this dataset
was extracted by a larger one presented in the paper [71].
Attack Normal
Training Set 1540 2400
Test Set 386 600
Table 4.6: Traffic Dataset Description
In this case we added smart noise, simulating that a malicious user put some
new attacks in the network, or make a poisoning training set attack, contaminating
the training set with some samples that are considered falsely normal packets.
A dataset description is made in the table 4.6.
Also in this case the system recognize the presence of noise into the training
set. We can monitor this situation giving a look to the percentage of class changes
in the first step as it is possible to see in figure 4.9.
We tested SOCIAL with this new data; by giving a look to a comparison with
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Figure 4.9: % Class changes in the 1st step for different % of noise
the other MCS approaches, in this case SOCIAL’s performance are comparable
with the other ones (figure 4.10). But it’s worth nothing, that also the Decision
Tree, trained with the the clean training set reaches the same performance of SO-
CIAL, sometimes it is better than it. The point is that the system can reach the
same performance with very simple classifier, and so with a lower computational
complexity. An other advantage is the possibility to easily understand the main
rules behind the classification problem by using a rule generator after the dataset
cleaning up.
As an example, we will show how SOCIAL cleans the training set in the case
of 30% of contamination, figure 4.11
In the chapter 5 will be shown another example for the traffic flow identifica-
tion.
4.3.4 Key Findings
We find out a methodology that try to clean a training set from the noise by us-
ing a MCS approach. This system is designed to work in an adversarial learning
context, in which a malicious user try to camouflage the training pattern to over-
come the classification system. We noticed that SOCIAL reaches a good level of
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Figure 4.10: Accuracy Comparison for different % of Smart-noise
Figure 4.11: Traffic Intrusion Evolution: SOCIAL and DT
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robustness to this kind of noise, and it gives a clean dataset that could be also used
in a faster and easier classification system. In this way it is possible to overcame
the computational complexity linked to the SOCIAL architecture.
SOCIAL gives rise to a simple classification problem. The cons of this is, that
if the system is not stopped in time, the sample distribution could be modified, so
damaging the dataset and the possible performance of the classifier.
As regard to the convergence, the system could also be seen as a non linear
dynamic system, and it could be of interest to analyse some stability issues of its
behaviour.
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Classification Accuracy δdB
Noiseless Noisy 1st Step
2nd Step 3th Step 4th Step
5
th Step – Output 6th Step 7th Step
8th Step 9th Step 10th Step
Figure 4.12: Gaussian Distribution starting from 30% of Noise
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Classification Accuracy δdB
Noiseless Noisy 1st Step
2nd Step 3th Step 4th Step
5th Step 6th Step – Output 7th Step
8th Step 9th Step 10th Step
Figure 4.13: Mixture Of Gaussian starting from 30% of Noise
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Classification Accuracy δdB
Noiseless Noisy 1st Step
2nd Step 3th Step 4th Step
5
th Step – Output 6th Step 7th Step
8th Step 9th Step 10th Step
Figure 4.14: Rotated Check Board (45◦) starting from 30% of Noise
Chapter 5
Network Protocol Verification by a
Classifier Selection Ensemble
In the last years, networking research has started facing a problem not foreseen
when the first Internet protocols were originally designed: network traffic classi-
fication, that is, associating traffic flows to the applications that generated them
[56]. Originally each network application used known protocols and transport-
level ports that easily allowed their identification. Since a few years back, this is
not true any more [42, 59]. The number of network applications using proprietary
undisclosed protocols has grown at an incredible rate (Skype, P2P-IPTV); the typ-
ical association application/port is often forged; in some cases traffic is encrypted,
whereas sometimes it is encapsulated into traditional protocols. Beyond the need
to understand which kind of traffic is carried on Internet links, the identification of
traffic hidden in flows using well-known ports represents a challenging task. For
these reasons, new approaches to traffic identification are needed. By traffic iden-
tification here we mean identification of a particular (or a group of) applications
of interest.
This is a typical case study for the Adversarial Classification problem. In this
case some malicious users try to overcame the classification system in different
ways.
In this chapter we propose a novel identification technique based on packet-
level information aiming at exploiting behavioural characteristics of different ap-
plications. Specifically, we will describe a method that use of both the sign pat-
64
5.1. MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORK 65
tern and the sizes of the first four packets of each flow to label the flow as accepted
(identified) or rejected. The accepted class is the protocol/application convention-
ally associated with the respective port number. The rejected class is related to
applications that try to hide their presence typically with the purpose to circum-
vent network usage/security policies. The proposed approach is aimed at a high
accuracy of identification, being at the same fast and universal. First, it uses the
direction signs and the sizes of only the first four packets of each flow (targeted
to work online), and second, it does not need to access the payload of the packets
(does not affect privacy and works with encrypted packets).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 discusses briefly our motiva-
tion. Section 5.2 provides details about the techniques at the base of our identifi-
cation approach. Section 5.3 describes the dataset and the measurement approach
used in the experimental validation. We show results of identification of “port 80”
traffic in Section 5.4. At the very end, we try to apply SOCIAL, the algorithm
presented in Chapter 4, to clean the training sets and we will compare it with the
proposed approach.
5.1 Motivation and Related Work
Even if commonly considered unreliable, the classification/identification approach
known as port-based is still used today for online monitoring. Its advantages are
simplicity and speed, as it checks only a single packet-header field. Besides, in
some real-world situations there are no effective alternatives. An immediate al-
ternative proposed in the literature (and promptly adopted by the industry) are the
payload-based approaches based on the inspection of the transport-level packet
payload (the data produced by the application). These techniques usually compare
packet contents against known signatures of application-level protocols. Such
techniques were initially considered very reliable, and were used to build refer-
ence data in the evaluation of novel classification approaches [62, 43]. Today,
however, their reliability and applicability are undermined by a number of fac-
tors. First, there are continuously arising undisclosed proprietary protocols and
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techniques of protocol obfuscation (e.g., eMule/eDonkey). Second, several new-
generation applications (e.g., instant messaging, file sharing) make use of tradi-
tional protocols (e.g. HTTP) to encapsulate their traffic, which deceives payload-
based classifiers into erroneously associating the traffic to the encapsulating proto-
col. Third, new-generation applications (e.g., Skype) use packet-payload encryp-
tion techniques. In addition, network-level (e.g., IPSEC) and application-level
(e.g., ssh) encryption tunnels are being increasingly used in the Internet. Even
when they are feasible, payload-based approaches face further difficulties: (i)
payload inspection requires accessing all user-transmitted data, which may breach
privacy laws in some countries; (ii) the computational resources required to in-
spect the entire content of the packets is usually quite high, making it difficult to
deploy such techniques when the traffic volume is large. Because of the growing
problems with the payload-based approaches, new statistical-based classification
approaches have been proposed that do not need access to packet content. These
approaches use flow characteristics as features to train classifiers from the state-
of-the-art machine learning. The explosion of high-quality scientific literature in
this field [60, 25, 81, 4, 8, 26, 44, 8, 82, 76, 67, 44, 17] testifies the great inter-
est in researching novel and accurate techniques for traffic classification. It has
been demonstrated that the statistical-based approaches can achieve high accu-
racy, and that they appear to be the most promising approaches to face problems
like protocol obfuscation, encapsulation, and encryption [79, 8].
In this chapter we propose a technique for the identification of hidden traffic
flows using non-intrusive features and based on machine learning drawing upon a
recent study by Gargiulo et al. [32]. We carry out an extensive experiment with
an ensemble of Decision Trees where the input features are the sizes of the first
four packets with payload, and the ensemble member that makes the decision is
chosen by the combination of signs of these packets.
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5.2 The Identification Approach
The requirement for operational speed brings in the idea of classifier selection en-
semble where only one of a set of experts has to make a decision [32, 47]. The
ensemble consists of member classifiers (experts) and an oracle that authorises
one of the classifiers to pass its decision as the ensemble decision. Generally
speaking, the oracle may have pre-defined regions of competence for the classi-
fiers [66] or dynamically allocated regions [78]. Gargiulo et al. [32] propose to
use the port number as the oracle determining the regions of competence. The di-
rections and sizes of the first four packets of the TCP flow are then used as the
features in a further 2-stage classifier (Figure 5.1). The features and the modu-
lar architecture were chosen so that the classification is both fast and accurate,
and new modules can be trained and added to the system without re-training any
already trained part.
5.2.1 The Features
Following [4],[27] and [29], we propose to use only the first four packets and to
use the following features (see Section 5.3.2 for details on feature extraction):
• x0, the port number;
• x1, x2, x3, x4, the directions of the first four packets, xi ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 means
that the packet is transferred from server to client, and 1, from client to server;
• s1, s2, s3, s4, the payload sizes of the first four packets, where si are positive
integers. As in [27], we do not consider packets without payload because they are
related to connections state information.
5.2.2 Stage 1: Sign Pattern Filter
To illustrate the system we use a data set consisting of network traffic traces at
the University of Brescia (Italy) [27]. The known protocols in the training data
are: POP3, SMTP, HTTP, msn, FTP and BitTorrent. Table 5.2.2 shows a sum-
mary of the training data as distributed across the 16 possible patterns of signs
[x1, x2, x3, x4], from 0000 to 1111.
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Figure 5.1: The generic classifier ensemble architecture.
Signs Protocol and port number
POP3 FTP SMTP msn BitTorr HTTP
123 4 110 21 25 1863 6881 80
000 0 0 138 16 0 0 3
000 1 1 75 55 0 0 0
001 0 21 216 543 0 0 0
001 1 0 0 4 0 1 0
010 0 749 21 604 1 0 0
010 1 18823 5845 18186 0 1 0
011 0 17 1 18 0 1 0
011 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
100 0 0 0 0 328 23 5348
100 1 0 0 0 30 520 240
101 0 0 0 0 660 3609 826
101 1 0 0 0 4 753 12
110 0 0 0 0 1 8 427
110 1 0 0 0 0 87 76
111 0 0 0 0 0 9 108
111 1 0 0 0 0 45 23
Table 5.1: Summary of the Brescia network traffic data (training).
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The table shows that groups of protocols can be distinguished by the sign
patterns. For example, protocols msn (1863), BitTorrent (6881) and HTTP (80)
hardly ever begin with a packet from sever to client (x1 = 0). The table suggests
that the sign patterns can be used to filter out very quickly flows that do not match
the pattern of the class they are supposed to be a part of. In Figure 5.1, this is
labelled as the sign pattern filter. In this paper we focus on the TCP traffic on
port 80, so flows with patterns beginning with x1 = 0 will be rejected by the filter.
Next, using the training data, we can choose a rejection threshold, of say, 2%, and
filter out all sign patterns where the number of flows is below the threshold. With
this filter in place, the “allowed” combinations of signs for the HTTP protocol
(80) are 1000, 1001, 1010, and 1100. All other protocols will be rejected by the
sign pattern filter.
5.2.3 Stage 2: Decision Tree classifier using payload sizes
A separate classifier is then trained for each sign combination that passes through
the sign filter. Here, each classifier has to solve a two-class problem: match ver-
sus mismatch of the protocol/application conventionally associated with the re-
spective port number. We chose the Decision Tree [24] classifier, since its classifi-
cation speed makes it very effective for an online implementation [76] and it does
not assume any type of probability distribution of the data [32].
The decision process of a Decision Tree classifier is intuitive, since it can
be traced as a sequence of simple decisions. The first decision is made at the
root; depending on the answer, a branch is selected and the child node is visited.
Another decision is made at this node, and so on, until a leaf is reached. The
leaf contains a single class label, which is assigned to the object being classified.
In our case the C4.5 algorithm was employed for constructing the Decision Tree
classifiers. We used the Weka implementation, called J481.
The choice of a Decision Tree classifier can be justified by the following ex-
ample. Figure 5.2 shows the scatter-plot of a dataset of traffic traces taken from the
1Weka is an open source collection of data-mining tools and is freely available at the website
http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka.
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University of Brescia, Italy (UNIBS, see Section 5.3.1 for the dataset description).
The data is filtered so that only flows with sign pattern [x1, x2, x3, x4] = 1010 are
displayed. The (x, y) coordinate axes are the first two size features, s1 and s2,
respectively. The figure shows three protocol classes: BitTorrent (3609 flows),
HTTP (826) and msn (660). Two classification regions – HTTP vs the other two
classes – can be clearly distinguished. Class HTTP seems the predominant class
in Figure 5.2, however, this is not the case. Classes BitTorrent and msn are ex-
tremely dense, and are located towards the bottom left corner of the scatter-plot.
Figure 5.3 displays an approximation of the 2-D densities of the three classes. The
well delineated classification regions of high density suggest that a Decision Tree
classifier would be the most suitable choice.
Figure 5.2: Scatter-plot of the UNIBS training data, first two size features.
(a) HTTP (b) msn (c) BitTorrent
Figure 5.3: 2D density of the UNIBS training data with sign pattern 1010.
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5.3 Dataset and Feature Extraction
5.3.1 Dataset
To validate the proposed approach we used training datasets from three differ-
ent institutions: University of Brescia in Italy (UNIBS), Lawrence Berkeley Na-
tional Laboratory (LBNL) and Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis
(CAIDA). A summary of the content of the three data sets used to train our system
is given in Table 5.2. As testing set we used traces from University of Napoli in
Italy (UNINA). From this network we collected and used traffic traces related to
two different time periods, 2004 (hereinafter denoted as UNINA2004) and 2009
(hereinafter denoted as UNINA2009). Details about the flows composing these
traces are reported in Table 5.3.1.
Table 5.2: Number of flows in the three training data sets.
UNIBS CAIDA LBNL
Protocol Port
POP3 110 19611 9591 1172
SMTP 25 19427 11831 20825
HTTP 80 7063 5930 81984
FTP 21 6296 1652 –
BitTorrent 6881 5057 – –
msn 1863 1024 – –
netbios-ssn 139 – 4575 –
HTTPS 443 – 25427 18013
oms 4662 – – 1716
IMAP4 993 – – 7677
UNINA2004 UNINA2009
Protocol Port
HTTP 80 506795 144042
non-HTTP 80 2245 803
Table 5.3: Number of flows in the UNINA data sets used for testing.
Evaluating machine learning algorithms for automated network application
identification. As explained in the next Section, in this work we focus our exper-
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iments on the identification of HTTP traffic flowing through port TCP 80. Thus,
during the training phase, for each sign pattern we train the corresponding pay-
load size classifier (a Decision Tree) assigning all the HTTP flows to one class
(the one corresponding to traffic to be accepted), and all the other flows (e.g. from
msn, BitTorrent, etc.) that match the considered sign pattern as the other class
(traffic to be rejected). For example, in the case of the 1010 combination for the
UNIBS dataset we train the classifier with HTTP against msn and BitTorrent (see
Table 5.2.2).
5.3.2 Feature Extraction
To extract the nine features we used TIE (Traffic Identification Engine) [16], an
open-source multi-classifier system whose architecture is shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Overall Architecture of TIE.
For this work we used TIE for (i) processing and filtering traffic traces, (ii)
aggregating packets into sessions, and (iii) extracting features. The features pro-
duced by TIE have been fed to a prototype implementation of the identification
approach described in Section 5.2. Moreover, we used TIE with a classification
plugin based on a payload-inspection technique in order to establish the “ground-
truth” of the given traces. This allowed us to label each flow and to evaluate the
accuracy of our approach (see Section 5.4). We looked at the payload content us-
ing the TIE-L7 plugin module, which implements the Linux L7-filter classification
technique2.
In the experiments presented we focused on traffic on TCP port 80. The Packet
Capture TIE module filters out all traffic not pertaining to the port, whereas the
TIE module named Session Builder is responsible for aggregating the remaining
2L7-filter is an application layer packet classifier for linux and is freely available at the website
http://l7-filter.sourceforge.net.
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packets into bidirectional flows (biflows). That is, we consider the common defi-
nition of flow tuple while taking into account traffic in both directions: upstream
and downstream. The upstream direction is the one of the first packet observed.
Moreover, because we are examining TCP traffic, instead of a time-out value we
use simple heuristics based on SYN, FIN, RST flags in TCP headers, in order to
approximate TCP connections (as described in [16]).
The Feature Extraction module is responsible for extracting classification fea-
tures from each biflow. In order to take into account only properties related to
the application, we record the sizes of the transport-level payload, excluding pure
TCP packets that do not carry application-level data (e.g., empty ACK packets).
The payload sizes are stored in the order they are observed. A sign is added de-
pending on the packet direction, plus for upstream and minus for downstream.
Each biflow is assigned a session id, which can later be used to manually exam-
ine the biflow, or to process again the same traffic trace using TIE classifiers and
checking the results (as in Section 5.4).
5.4 Experimental Results
In this section we show the results obtained with the proposed identification ar-
chitecture. In particular, we want to demonstrate that if we train the system with
traffic traces taken from different sites (spatial invariance) and in a different time
(temporal invariance) we can correctly accept HTTP traffic and reject non-HTTP
traffic.
To show the results we choose the following metrics:
• Overall Accuracy: The percentage of correctly classified flows.
• HTTP Accuracy: The percentage of the correctly classified HTTP flows
out of all true HTTP flows (sensitivity).
• non-HTTP Accuracy: The percentage of the correctly classified non-HTTP
flows out of all non-HTTP flows (specificity).
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For assessing the effectiveness of the proposed approach in different time pe-
riods (temporal invariance), we carried out cross-testing using UNINA2004 and
UNINA2009 traces. In order to verify the spatial invariance of the approach, we
train the system with LBNL, CAIDA and UNIBS traces, and then test the system
with both UNINA2004 and UNINA2009 traces.
Table 5.4 is obtained by training and testing the system by using a 10-fold
cross validation protocol. That is, the whole dataset is divided into 10 folds; 9 of
them are used to train the classifiers and the last fold is used for testing. This is
carried out for all 10 folds and results are reported as average accuracies. The table
shows high accuracy for UNINA2004, and hints about the diversity of non-HTTP
traces that might have caused the low specificity for UNINA2009.
Table 5.4: Results obtained using UNINA2004 and UNINA2009 datasets
Overall HTTP non-HTTP
Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
UNINA2004 99.97% 99.99% 96.08%
UNINA2009 99.97% 99.99% 86.23%
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 report the results obtained by training the system with
LBNL, CAIDA and UNIBS traces, and testing it with the other two traces. Both
tables indicate that the recognition rate of the non-HTTP protocol depends on
the training set. The worst results in rejecting non-HTTP flows are obtained
when LBNL traces are used for training and the system is tested on UNINA2009
(85.45%). This is due to the fact that class non-HTTP is not very well repre-
sented in the LBNL data. Figure 5.5 shows a scatter-plot of the UNINA2009 data
for the four “allowed” sign patterns for port 80. The non-HTTP protocols are
marked with green triangles. The misclassified protocols are circled. The figure
demonstrates a degree of mismatch between the training (LBNL) and the testing
(UNINA2009) data. It should be noted however, that the representation in the fig-
ure may be misleading because it does not reflect the density of the data. The
plot for sign 0100, (a), for example, contain 47616 traces, of which 11 non-HTTP.
There is only one mistake in the non-HTTP class (accepting a non-HTTP pro-
tocol), which amounts to 91% specificity. The highlighted mistakes are only a
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fraction of the true HTTP class that were wrongly rejected (185 biflows in subplot
(a), equivalent to 0.39%).
(a) 1000 (b) 1001
(c) 1010 (d) 1100
Figure 5.5: Scatterplot of the UNINA2009 using LBNL training data.
As with Table 5.4, there is a decline in the correct recognition rate of non-
HTTP traffic from 2004 to 2009. Again, this may be explained with the hypoth-
esis that some of the new non-HTTP traffic biflows are more similar to normal
HTTP compared to the ones in the 2004 data. This notwithstanding, the obtained
results remain very good since in the worst case over 85% of non-HTTP flows are
rejected. In order to improve the performance the Decision Tree classifiers may
be re-trained with new counterexamples. An advantage of the chosen architecture
is that it allows us to do that for any of the classifiers without changing the rest of
them.
In order to better assess the approach here presented and to further investigate
the results obtained, we analysed traffic flowing through port TCP 80 that was la-
belled by our identification system as ‘rejected’. Firstly, we added a feature in
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Table 5.5: Results obtained by testing the system with UNINA2004.
Training Overall HTTP non-HTTP
Dataset Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
LBNL 99.69% 99.73% 88.96%
CAIDA 99.25% 99.25% 97.84%
BRESCIA 96.45% 96.44% 99.64%
Table 5.6: Results obtained by testing the system with UNINA2009.
Training Overall HTTP non-HTTP
Dataset Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
LBNL 99.26% 99.28% 85.45%
CAIDA 98.82% 98.83% 92.73%
BRESCIA 99.21% 99.22% 94.55%
TIE to examine the first few bytes of payload carrying TCP payload exchanged
in each biflow. This allowed us to perform a preliminary automated examination
of all the biflows and to verify the results of the identification by easily checking
application-level packet content. In addition, we manually inspected the biflows,
mainly focusing on what was recognized as non-HTTP by the classifier. First of
all, such analysis confirmed that all the correctly accepted biflows were actually
related to HTTP traffic. For example we observed that almost 94% of the biflows
in UNINA2004 started with a standard HTTP GET request, 4% with a POST re-
quest, etc. On the other side, we discovered that several ’rejected’ biflows we
generated by peer-to-peer application-level protocols as eDonkey, Bittorrent, and
WinMX. Some of them started with a byte not corresponding to an alphabetic
character. Inside this category, most of them started with the byte 0xe3. As re-
ported by Karagiannis et al. in [43], this is the first byte exchanged by peers open-
ing a communication session based on the eDonkey2000 protocol (used by the
eDonkey and eMule file-sharing applications). Moreover, in both UNINA2004
and UNINA2009 traces, up to 50% of the non-HTTP biflows could not be as-
cribed to a specific application using either automated or manual payload inspec-
tion. However, we manually verified that these biflows did not exchange any
HTTP traffic; we therefore conclude that such traffic is generated by applications
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using undisclosed proprietary protocols.
The whole analysis described here confirms that the identification approach
proposed in this work is very effective in correctly discriminating real HTTP traf-
fic using the well-known port TCP 80. Finally, we observe that in the traces
the non-HTTP traffic represents a not negligible portion of the captured traffic.
Indeed, after filtering our traces by removing biflows related to non-HTTP traf-
fic, about 5% of the packets were discarded (both in the UNINA2004 and UN-
INA2009 trace). Moreover, it must be observed that on the UNINA network there
were no rules enforced to prevent traffic on non-standard ports. Therefore most
of the connections masquerading as HTTP were probably due to the configuration
of external peers located in networks where port-based traffic filtering was strictly
enforced. It is reasonable to hypothesize that if this was also the case of the UN-
INA network, then such masquerading traffic would have covered an even higher
percentage.
5.4.1 Results obtained with the training set cleaned by SO-
CIAL
Finally, we tried to apply SOCIAL, the algorithm presented in Chapter 4, to clean
the training sets described so far.
Originals Cleaned by SOCIAL
Training Overall HTTP non-HTTP
Dataset Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
LBNL 99.65% 98.32% 93.65%
CAIDA 99.17% 99.17% 99.56%
BRESCIA 98.38% 98.38% 99.56%
Training Overall HTTP non-HTTP
Dataset Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
LBNL 99.78% 99.78% 99.34%
CAIDA 99.17% 99.17% 99.56%
BRESCIA 98.86% 98.86% 99.67%
Table 5.7: Results obtained by using UNINA2004 “cleaned” by SOCIAL.
To this aim we trained a decision tree classifier with the cleaned datasets and
we tested it with UNINA2004 and UNINA2009.
In table 5.7 the results obtained to distinguish between http on not-http on UN-
INA2004 dataset are shown. The table on the right contains the results obtained
on the dataset cleaned by SOCIAL, while the table on the left contains the results
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obtained with the original dataset. The same thing is proposed in the table 5.8 for
the UNINA2009 dataset.
Originals Cleaned by SOCIAL
Training Overall HTTP non-HTTP
Dataset Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
LBNL 99.17% 99.26% 51.45%
CAIDA 98.94% left 98.96% 51.45%
BRESCIA 98.55% 98.57% 88.40%
Training Overall HTTP non-HTTP
Dataset Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
LBNL 99.50% 99.52% 87.68%
CAIDA 98.98% 99.00% 89.13%
BRESCIA 98.40% 98.41% 89.13%
Table 5.8: Results obtained by using UNINA2009 “cleaned” by SOCIAL.
The results shown that the system performs always better than the Decision
Tree trained on the original dataset. Another important result is figured out com-
paring this results with the ones proposed into the table 5.7 and in the table 5.6,
where the results obtained with the hierarchical MCS proposed are described, also
in this case a simple decision tree is comparable in terms of accuracy with a more
sophisticated architecture as the one proposed in this chapter.
It is worth noting that the three training set are quite old, that’s why they reach
better values of accuracy on the UNINA2004, while testing them on UNINA2009
the results are not brilliant. Even making this considerations, using SOCIAL to
clean the training sets, we reached a good level of accuracy even with the newer
training set.
It is possible to see the temporal traffic variation in perfect analogy to the
mutation inducted by a malicious user. That’s why the results shown in this tables
demonstrate a adversarial classification robustness of the training sets cleaned by
SOCIAL.
5.5 Key Findings
We examined the ability of a classifier ensemble system to identify traffic flows
that do not belong to their declared class. The system takes the direction signs of
the first four packets carrying payload and filters out the most improbable flows.
The remaining flows have “acceptable” sign patterns. A decision tree classifier is
trained for each sign pattern. Here we focused on TCP on port 80, trying to sepa-
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rate true HTTP traffic from non-HTTP traffic flowing through the same port (e.g.
in order to circumvent network policies). We imposed four acceptable sign pat-
terns: 1000, 1001, 1010 and 1100. A Decision Tree classifier is designed for each
of them. We found that the system is very accurate when trained and tested on data
coming from the same distribution (tested through cross-validation on traces from
the University of Napoli - UNINA2004 and UNINA2009). Furthermore, the sys-
tem exhibits very high accuracy in cross-testing, i.e., trained on one network and
tested on another. We verified this by training the system on three different data
sets (LBNL, CAIDA and BRESCIA) and testing it with UNINA2004 and UN-
INA2009. We looked in more detail in the worst case (accuracy 85.45%) where
the system was trained on LBNL and tested on UNINA2009. It seems that the
LBNL data did not have a sufficiently representative non-HTTP class in order to
train the system properly. The high overall accuracies in the cross-testing demon-
strate what we call the “spatial invariance” of the system. In addition, the system
shows “time invariance” in that the accuracy did not drop dramatically from 2004
to 2009 even though some decline was observed. Finally, due to its design and to
the use of Decision Trees, the system is very fast, and it can be used online.
This approach is based on a multi-stage architecture made up of an ensemble
of Decision Trees, each one devoted to verify if the flow under test belongs or not
to the protocol whose port number refers to. Each Decision Tree is activated by a
specific combination of the signs of the first four packets of the flow and performs
the verification process by considering the payload sizes of these four packets. We
showed results in the case of traffic flows hidden behind “port 80”-based flows.
Using real traffic traces from four different networks we showed the high accuracy
of the proposed approach, that also demonstrates:
• spatial invariance, since it was able to reject non-HTTP traffic captured in
a network different from the ones considered during the training phase;
• temporal invariance, since it worked well with traffic traces captured in
very different temporal periods (over a range of five years);
• on-line capability, since only the first four packets are needed for carried
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out the verification process;
• adversarial classification robustness, since it was robust to different ty-
pology of traffic not seen in the training phase.
Another advantage of a classifier based on Decision Trees is that it can be seen as
a set of simple decision rules that can be easily interpreted by a domain expert.
A further research direction will be a deeper analysis of such decision rules in
order to understand better the behaviour of the proposed traffic identification sys-
tem. We are also planning to apply the proposed approach to other well-known
protocols.
Chapter 6
An Anti-Spam System based on a
Behaviour-Knowledge Space
It is a well-known story that e-mail has grown from a tool used by few universities
and scientists to a ubiquitous communication tool, evolving from simple plain text
into a powerful multimedia message. At the same time, following the growth of
e-mail production and diffusion, spam has changed from a little and sometimes
bothering problem into a multi-billion dollar problem. The presence of spam, in
fact, can seriously compromise normal user activities, forcing to navigate through
mailboxes to find the - relatively few - interesting e-mails, so wasting time and
bandwidth and occupying huge storage space.
The types of those messages vary: some of them contains advertisements,
other e-mails provides winning notifications, and sometimes we get messages with
executable files, which finally emerge as malicious codes, such as viruses and
Trojan horses. In addition, spam e-mails may often have unsuitable content (as
a pornographic material advertising) that is illegal and sometimes dangerous for
non adult users.
The recognition of spam content is not a trivial problem: there are some factors
that are related with human perception, economic behaviour, legal context, that
are hardly measurable or summarized in adequate features. The same definition
of spam e-mails requires a common agreement that is not easy to find.
In our opinion, all kind of spam e-mails have several common characteristics,
such as: i) they are unsolicited, ii) they have a commercial content, even though
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the content itself is continuously evolving, trying to outsmart the classical coun-
termeasures adopted by anti-spam filters.
This kind of task belong to the adversarial classification problems, since
there is an intelligent, adaptive adversary who tries to camouflage patterns (spam
e-mails) to evade the security system.
Consequently, a great variety of technical methodology have been implemented
in current anti-spam systems [11]. The common technical solutions propose fil-
tering strategies based on sender address and/or body content. We focused our
attention on that measures related to e-mail contents, in particular both texts and
images, rather then on networking and identity strategies [68], since our goal is to
develop a personal antispam system.
In this chapter we combine the visual clues with the semantic information
related to the e-mail body, to determine whether a message is spam. In order
to address the problem of combining a non-constant number of modules, since
it is not possible to a priori known if there is one or more images attached to
the e-mail and/or there are textual information to be processed, we propose the
use of a Behaviour Knowledge Space [39] approach. This also allows us to easily
include new modules in our architecture that could be required for addressing new
spammers’ tricks.
Organization of the Chapter
The chapter is organized as follows: the Section 6.1 describes at a glance the main
component of the proposed system; in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 we describe text and
image features respectively, while in Section 6.4 we show how to combine them.
In Section 6.5 several experiments are discussed, and finally in Section 6.6 we
report some considerations.
6.1 System Architecture
As shown in figure 6.1, we design a system that integrates image-based and text-
based analysis, the dashed line, in the figure, represents the OCR output that is
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filled into the Text Analyser. The mails, initially, are parsed by a Multi-purpose
Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) parser, that can retrieve the different parts of
the e-mails: the text parts, the attached images or text files, the email subject
and the headers. The text is thus processed by a Text Analyzer module according
to the methodology described in the section 6.2 and its output is a classification
result obtained using the feature vector of text part of input email. The images
are forwarded to the Image Analyser module which gives another classification
results for the features vector that is extracted with the techniques described in
section 6.3 for the image part of the email. We note that the OCR output of the
Image Analyser could be used also by Text Analyser in order to build its feature
vector. The Fusion block has the role to combine the previous output furnishing
the final classification of each e-mail using the strategy discussed starting from
the section 6.4.
Figure 6.1: The proposed system architecture.
Both the Text and the Image analyser can be implemented by means of differ-
ent classifiers, each one using different features. In the following, we will describe
in details the different feature sets used and the combination process.
6.2 Textual Features
Textual filtering methods are widely deployed; they varies in the inspected content
and the proposed methodology. Some filters consider only the header or the body
of an e-mail, while other ones take both. These approaches use different mod-
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els, considering word-tokens, their frequencies and their combinations. In rule
based-filters [13] the users define some rules related to the headers or the bodies,
considering particular words as sign of spam content; anyway, this simple solution
is strongly dependent on how the words used by spammers can change.
Differently, Signature-based methods do not really deal with whole messages
or specific tokens, transforming the message into a signature. Clearly, the meth-
ods effectiveness is related to the robustness of the signature function. Note that
a signature database must be distributed and kept up to date very frequently, due
to the rapid variation of spam e-mails. To this regard, some proposals are based
on collaborative solutions, in particular on Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks for sig-
nature distribution [83, 19]. These approaches are not well suited for developing
a personal antispam system.
Other approaches consider spam detection as a binary classification problem
and several algorithms from the learning theory research field have been used. In
these solutions, e-mails are mapped into multidimensional space, each dimension
representing the words in the e-mail content; several measures are proposed such
as the terms-frequency (tf ) or the product between the documents-frequency (df )
and terms-frequency, as in [23]. Statistical filters based on the the Bayes theory
have been also investigated [2, 58].
One of the drawback of these last methods is that they typically do not con-
sider specific countermeasures for taking into account new spammer tricks, so a
complete retraining of the system is needed when these attacks arise.
We propose a strategy based on text processing and analysis in order to process
both semantic and syntactical features. Generally speaking, our main idea is to
characterize how e-mails belonging to the same class (ham or spam) do have the
same meanings, using a set of semantic features in addition with the detection of
special characters (syntactical features) that are typically used into spam context.
In particular, at the semantic level we analyze the whole email content taking
into account the word localization in a given context thus measuring the weight of
a single word in the document. In this way, we relate the emails content to certain
topic by looking at commonly shared words. A topic is described by a region of
6.2. TEXTUAL FEATURES 85
Spam Topics
Investment/Business
Health/Medicine
Games,
Software
Leisure/Travel
Adult
Finance
Product/Service.
Table 6.1: The list of contents in spam mails
multidimensional space shared from the vectors of words of different e-mails. In
the spam context, example of e-mail topics are reported in table 6.2. In section
6.2.1, we will describe the model used to discover the semantic content of e-mails.
The use of syntactical features is suitable to detect grammar anomalies in the
texts. Typically, the ham e-mails do not have particular occurrences of special
characters: these one can be thus used as signs of low trustworthiness of the
received e-mail;the related developed methodology will be described in section
6.2.2.
6.2.1 Semantic Features
We propose to use a feature set based on a modified version of Vector Space
Model (VSM) [54]. This model is based on the representation of documents as
vector in multidimensional space. The representation of e-mail textual content
in the vector space model has a number of advantages, including the uniform
treatment of queries and documents as vectors and the ability to differently weight
the different terms; anyway, it suffers from its inability to cope with two classic
problems arising in natural languages [41], i.e. synonymy and polysemy. We
briefly recall that synonymy refers to a case where two different words (say ”pupil“
and ”scholar“) have the same meaning, and polysemy refers to the case where a
term such as ”play” has multiple meanings according to different contexts. In
fact as worst case of the influence of synonymy in similarity measure, we could
have two orthogonal vectors with 0 as result of cosine similarity even if there are
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two different words that have the same meaning inside those two vectors. The
semantic correlation or disambiguation of the these terms can be made looking
at the context in which they are placed, for example the terms “scholar” can be
correlated to “pupil” if the documents, in which they are, also contains terms like
“school”, “book”, “pen” and so on. In that way the shared terms can increase the
value of similarity measures. The idea of looking at the whole email document can
be seen also as an overcoming of the independence hypothesis used in a bayesian
filter technique known as bag-of-words model that is one most used approach
for anti-spam filer. In that model the relationships among set of words (joint
distribution) are simply factorized. In order to overcome the fault of vector space
model to capture the synonymy and polysemy relationships, we choose a modified
version of VSM, the Latent Semantic Analysis or LSA [54]. Despite LSA is a
traditional and well accepted technique used to stick out the semantic contents in
text-process community, there are few application in the spam framework. LSA
is an application of Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to document-by-term
N ×M matrices A. In particular, SVD provides a suitable matrix decomposition
as described in the following:
A = TSDT
being S=diag(σ1, . . . , σr) a M ×N matrix, with σi =
√
λi and λi ≥ λi+1 with
1 ≤ i ≤ r; the λ1, ..., λr be the eigenvalues of AAT , r being the rank of A. Note
that ATA has the same eigenvalues of AAT .
The values σi are also denoted as the singular values of A. In the LSA tech-
nique, it is used a reduced version of A, Ak = TkSkDTk that is M ×N matrix and
k being a positive integer that is the maximum rank of Ak. After that decompo-
sition we can have a representation of documents and terms in the singular value
space, in fact we have a term matrix Lt = TkSk, called matrix of singular load-
ings for terms and Ld = SkDTk that is called the matrix of singular loadings for
documents. We note that this operation applied on the SVD decomposition has
two main properties described as following:
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• We have a dimensional reduction of the initial problems, in fact we can
represent the documents as features vectors of dimension k using the matrix
of singular loadings for documents Ld.
• We obtain a reduction that is representative of the nature of the documents.
In fact the Sk matrix have in the diagonal the decreasing order of the singular
values, this can use to correlate the document vector that shared common
terms using only a subset of their values.
The obtained approximation is computed taking into account the distance between
the two matrices X = A-Ak that is minimal according to a Frobenius norm [54].
In other words, we have a reduced space in which the words that have similar
co-occurrence patterns are projected (or collapsed) into the same dimension, and
in the indexing phase the technique projects the documents into the new gener-
ated space with latent semantic dimensions. The choice of k has been derived
empirically, with 80 to 100 dimensions being sometimes the optimal choice for
collections of about 5, 000 terms by 1, 000 documents [20]. In order to derive the
features to learn a classifier during the training phase, we adopt as text features
the projection of the document in the space obtained by Ld = Sk × DTk , Sk and
Dk being the matrices after the SVD reduction. In the testing phase we use also
this matrix product T Tk Q in order to compute the text features thanks to the SVD
equation:
(6.1) T Tk Q = SkDTk
(∗)k being the matrices obtained after the reduction process and Q being theN×1
matrix representing the input document.
There are different steps used to process the email text until the generation of
text feature both int the training phase and test phase. The different phases are
depicted in figure 6.2 and they are described as following:
• The Preprocessing module used a set of intelligent filters that we apply to
the email documents with or without the OCR recognized set of words.
These filters are:
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– The classical stop word list filter, that is used to delete the words that
have no particular meaning, although increasing the term vector di-
mension and thus degrading both performance and results of the sys-
tem. Typical example of stop word list are adverbs are pronouns.
– We also propose an intelligent filter that is able to detect and reject the
words that are not human-understandable, e.g. sequences like “fsdrx”,
“jkdld”. This solution is based on an SVM classifier trained on several
features derived from bigrams and trigrams composition of English
words. We also build a feature vector containing the ratio between the
correct bigrams (trigrams) and all the bigrams (trigrams) for a set of
170000 common English words. Note that the use of this kind of filter
has also the aim of enhancing the recognition of the semantic content
that can be used in particular spammer attacks, such as the ones which
use to put random words into e-mail texts, thus trying to reduce the
effectiveness of current antispam algorithms. This filter can also be
used to reject the words that are bad recognized by OCR algorithms.
– A Part of Speech filter (POS) module that is able to detects nouns,
verbs and adjective; it is used to reject adjectives that typically do not
give further additional information.
• The Stemming module implementing the well known Porter Stemmer al-
gorithms [64] that is used to remove the common morphological and in-
flexional endings from words in English. Here in after, the stemming and
preprocessing module will be called Text Processing (TP).
• The LSI module that implements the functionality of the model above de-
scribed; it takes as input the LSA model produced during the training phase.
We compute the “terms by documents matrix” used in those techniques us-
ing the following measures:
– Term-Frequency (TF)
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TFij =
nijP
r nij
nij being the number of occurrences of the term in document dj, and
the denominator being the sum of number of occurrences of all terms
in document dj.
– Inverse Document Frequency*Term-Frequency (IDF*TF)
IDTFij = TFij ∗DFi = TFij ∗ log( ND
N
Ti
D
)
ND being the number of total documents in the corpus and NTiD the
number of documents in the corpus in which compare the term Ti.
– Entropy Weight (WE)[50]:
WEij = TFij ∗ (1 +
∑
j
pij∗log2(pij)
log2(ND)
)
pij =
TFij
TFDi
being the probability to get document j given the term i
and TFDi being the term frequency of term i on the whole document
collection.
6.2.2 Syntactical Features
We propose to use some syntactic features that can be extracted from mail texts,
in order to estimate usual and suspected mail formats.
Spammers, in fact, usually try to obfuscate the textual part of an e-mail’s body
by substituting some characters in order to bypass the effectiveness of antispam
filters.
So, we defined another set of features for obtaining a characterization of this
kind of obfuscated text. The features we have investigated on are mainly based on
the presence of special characters, i.e. those characters that should not frequently
occur in a legitimate text. The whole set we considered is made up of the following
characters: { !, ”, #, $, %, &, ’, (, ), *, +, ,, -, . . . , /, @}. Starting from this set we
defined six syntactical features:
• text length: the number of characters of the whole text
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Figure 6.2: The different phases of the Text Analyzer
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• words number: the number of words in the text
• ambiguity: the ratio between the number of special and normal characters
• correctness: the ratio between the number of words that do not contain
special characters and the number of words that contain special characters
• special length: the maximum length of a continuous sequence of special
characters
• special distance: the maximum distance between two special characters
belonging to the above considered set.
6.3 Image Features
Image spam has been extensively studied using several techniques primarily de-
veloped from the Image Processing and Computer Vision community, using fea-
tures related to color distribution [3] or textual areas [3, 80]. A classifier is usually
trained on such features, trying to discriminate spam images from legitimate ones.
In [22], the authors present features that are focused on simple properties of the
image, making classification very fast. In this chapter, however, the authors com-
pletely disregard the textual part of the emails.
Other approaches basically try the detect textual areas in images following the
idea that images which contain texts are likely to be spam. In [74] the authors
propose an algorithm for text localization. They construct a corner detection al-
gorithm based on a circular template to predict the corner points of the text in
an image, which is crucial for text localization. The same idea is presented in
[12]. The method proposed there extracts edge features of a binarized image by
using higher-order local autocorrelation, and then passes these features to a Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM) for classification. In [38] the authors try instead to
extract connected components from the image in order to detect the presence of
an embedded text.
A quite different approach is followed in Fumera et al. [31], where the authors
propose to process each image by using an OCR system for extracting embedded
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texts.
All these approaches, however, cannot be effectively used when text within
images is voluntarily distorted and/or obfuscated. As it was noted in [9], in fact,
now spammers try to make OCR and text detection techniques ineffective without
compromising human readability, by placing text on non-uniform background,
or by using techniques like the ones exploited in CAPTCHAs1 (programs that
generate and grade tests that humans can pass but current computer programs
cannot).
We propose an approach for the detection of the image spam in which two
different image processing techniques are used [33]. The first one is devoted to
directly extract some global features from each image attached to the e-mails.
Such features should also be able to detect if images were adulterated or not, by
considering the complexity of the image itself as it is perceived from an human
being. The second processing is carried out by means of two steps: first, there
is a preprocessing phase with the use of an OCR, then a feature extraction pro-
cess starting from the OCR output try to characterize it in order to detect if the
embedded text has been voluntarily obfuscated and/or distorted.
6.3.1 Visual Features
The first set of features, that we called visual features, are directly obtained from
the image attached to the mails. In order to give an image characterization that
should be able to discriminate between normal and adulterated images, we con-
sidered features that describe the image texture from a statistic point of view. As
said before, in fact, spammers typically now try to bypass filters that use an OCR
for detecting texts within an image by obfuscating such texts with the addition of
some noise or by superimposing a texture (see also Figure 6.3 in which it is used
gocr2 as Optical Character Recognition tool). So, texture detection can help in in-
1The term CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Turing Test To Tell Computers and Humans
Apart) was coined in 2000 by Luis von Ahn, Manuel Blum, Nicholas Hopper and John Langford
of Carnegie Mellon University. At that time, they developed the first CAPTCHA to be used by
Yahoo – http://www.captcha.net/
2gocr is available at http://jocr.sourceforge.net
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Figure 6.3: Outputs obtained by applying gocr to some spam images
dividuating images that contain spam messages. For the sake of simplicity, in the
following we will present the considered features in case of gray-level images, but
the same operators can be applied to color images too.
We will use {I (x, y) , 0 ≤ x ≤ N − 1, 0 ≤ y ≤M − 1} to denote a N ×M
image withG gray levels. All the considered statistical texture measures are based
on the co-occurrence matrices. Spatial gray level co-occurrence estimates image
properties related to second-order statistics. The G×G gray level co-occurrence
matrix Pd for a displacement vector d = (dx, dy) is defined as follows. The entry
(i, j) of Pd is the number of occurrences of the pair of gray levels i and j which
are a distance d apart. Formally, it is given as:
Pd(i, j) = | {((r, s), (t, v)) : I(r, s) = i, I(t, v) = j} |
where (r, s), (t, v) ∈ N×M , (t, v) = (r+dx, s+dy) , and |.| is the cardinality
of a set.
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As regards the choice of the displacement vector d, we considered the four
direct neighbors of each pixel, i.e. we used four pairs as values of dx and dy
for calculating the number of co-occurrences, namely (0, 1), (1, 0), (−1, 0) and
(0,−1). We do not perform a normalization of Pd in order to preserve the depen-
dence of the considered features on the image size.
As suggested in [36], from the co-occurrence matrix it is possible to extract
features that can be used for detecting a texture within an image. In particular, we
considered the following five features:
• Contrast ∑
i
∑
j
(i− j)2Pd(i, j)
is the difference in terms of visual properties that makes an object (or its
representation within an image) distinguishable from other objects and the
background. In the visual perception of real world, contrast is determined
by the difference in the color and brightness of the object and other objects
within the same field of view. In practice, it is the ratio between the bright-
est and the darkest value of the image. In the case of a B/W image, note that
the increase of the contrast is equal to erase gray values.
• Entropy:
−
∑
i
∑
j
Pd(i, j)logPd(i, j)
is an index of the brightness variation among the pixel in an image. More
the values of brightness are different each others, more the entropy will be
higher.
• Energy: ∑
i
∑
j
P 2d (i, j)
is the spectral content of an image
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• Correlation: ∑
i
∑
j(i− µx)(j − µy)Pd(i, j)
σxσy
is an index of the correlation degree among the pixel. Here µx and µy are
the means and σx and σy are the standard deviations of Pd(x) and Pd(y) re-
spectively, where Pd(x) =
∑
j Pd(x, j) and Pd(y) =
∑
i Pd(i, y)
• Homogeneity: ∑
i
∑
j
Pd(i, j)
1 + |i− j|
is a measure of the brightness variation within the image. If the image is
completely black or white, its homogeneity value will be the maximum. On
the contrary, if the image contains several brightness variations, this value
will be very low.
Another category of features that can be used for characterizing images from
a global point of view is based on the complexity of an image for a human reader.
We have chosen to consider a feature also proposed in [9]:
• Perimetric Complexity: is defined as the squared length of the boundary
between black and white pixels (the perimeter) in the whole image, divided
by the black area.
Note that, differently from [9], we evaluate the perimetric complexity on the
whole image, after performing a binarization with a fixed threshold.
6.3.2 OCR-based Features
Here we propose to use the same features considered in Section 6.2.2. In this
case, however, special characters are extracted from the output of an OCR that
has received an attached image as input.
We have noticed, in fact, that characters embedded into an image are oppor-
tunely distorted and/or obfuscated in spam e-mails. Thus, most of the words can-
not be correctly detected, as we can see in Figure 6.3. Furthermore, several special
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characters that typically are not present in commonly used words can appear in the
OCR output.
6.4 Combining Text-based and Image-based Classi-
fiers
It has been experimentally shown that the combination of an ensemble of clas-
sifiers can be of great benefit in many practical pattern recognition applications.
Through the appropriate choice of a combination rule, it is possible to dampen the
overall effect of the independent errors in each observation domain, thus reaching
performance better than those of a single classifier.
The combination of classifiers is then an important part of our architecture.
Anyway, there are some problems that must be taken into account in this case:
• It is necessary to define a method for combining a non-constant number
of classifiers, since it is not possible to a priori known if there is one or
more images attached to the e-mail and/or there are textual information to
be processed.
• It should be avoided padding-attacks from spammers. That is, the possi-
bility that an attacker puts a spam message within a normal context, for
example by attaching an image containing an embedded spam message to
an e-mail that contains normal images.
As shown in Figure 6.4 we used a two-stage approach for combining text-
based and image-based classifiers. In the figure, “TP” stands for Text Processing;
it is described in section 6.2.1.
The first stage (denoted as Classification in Figure 6.4) consists in a simple
3-state logical OR, whose behavior is described in Figure 6.4. In this way we
also consider the case in which a classifier cannot be activated. It happens, for
example, when there are no images within the e-mail, or when there are no words
to be processed by the semantic analysis. In this situations, we assume that the
output of the classifier is undefined
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Figure 6.4: The proposed combination approach
address the problem of padding attacks, too. Just one correctly classified spam
image, in fact, is sufficient so that the block of the visual classifiers declares the
email as spam.
Then, at the second stage we adopt a Behaviour Knowledge Space (BKS) com-
bining rule [39]. The idea behind this rule is to avoid making unjustified assump-
tion on the classifier ensemble such as classifier independence. In Figure 6.4 an
example of how it works is shown.
A BKS is a K-dimensional space where each dimension corresponds to the
decision of a classifier. Given an e-mail to be assigned to one of 2 possible classes,
the ensemble of K classifiers can in theory provide 2K different decisions.
We must also consider the case in which the output of the 3-state logical OR is
undefined. In other words, each set of classifiers can attribute a mail to one out of
three possible classes, i.e. {Spam, Ham, Undefined} and the number of different
decisions becomes 3K .
Each one of these decisions constitutes one unit of the BKS. In the learning
6.4. COMBINING TEXT-BASED AND IMAGE-BASED CLASSIFIERS 98
Figure 6.5: The 3-state logical OR
Figure 6.6: The Behaviour Knowledge Space for combining classifiers.
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phase each BKS unit can record 2 different values ei (say, eham and espam), by
considering that the actual classes are only ham and spam. Given a suitably chosen
training set, each sample x of this set is classified by all the classifiers and the unit
that corresponds to the particular classifiers’ decision is activated. It records the
actual class of x, say Cj , by adding one to the value of ej . At the end of this phase,
each unit can calculate the best representative class associated to it, defined as the
class that exhibits the highest value of ei. This class corresponds to the most likely
class, given a classifiers’ decision that activates that unit.
In the operating mode, for each e-mail to be classified, the K decisions of the
classifiers are collected and the corresponding unit is selected. Then the e-mail is
assigned to the best representative class associated to that unit. Since we consider
all the possible combinations of classifiers outputs as the number of available
classifiers varies, we are implicitly handling the fact that the number of available
classifiers can be different for each e-mail.
It is worth noting that the proposed combining scheme could be also easily
extended using different feature sets, and then other classifiers. This could be
required, for example, for addressing new spammers’ tricks. In this case the prob-
lem is that the number of BKS unit grows exponentially and so a wider training
set is needed in order to achieve good classification results. However, as it will
be shown in the following Section, only a subset of all the possible units are typ-
ically activated in practice, since some configuration of the classifiers’ decisions
are not allowed.
6.5 Experimental Results
In the following we will first present the database used for assessing the effective-
ness of the proposed approach, then evaluate if the use of both visual and textual
features can improve the performance of the system with respect to the use of
a single set of features. Finally, we make a comparison of our approach with a
state-of-the-art anti-spam filter, i.e. SpamAssassin equipped with two different
spam image plug-ins.
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Total # of e-mails e-mails with Images
Spam Ham Spam Ham
9173 2479 1802 151
Table 6.2: The dataset used in our tests.
As regards the dataset, whose details are given in Table 6.2, it is composed by
11652 e-mails, 9173 of which contains spam messages. e-mails were collected
from the mailboxes of some users of the studenti.unina.itmailserver in a
period of about three years (2005-2007). This mailserver hosts the mailboxes of
all the students of the University of Naples Federico II. Among those e-mails, 151
contain ham images and 1802 contain spam images.
As regards the first stage of our architecture (the Classification one), we chose
a Decision Tree for implementing each classifier. In particular, a C4.5 (J48) com-
ing from the open source tool Weka3 was selected.
Each single classifier was trained on a set of 1,000 mails (500 for each class)
different from those belonging to the dataset reported in table 6.2. In order to train
the BKS rule, the dataset was split into two sets. Then, two experiments have been
made, by using a set for training and the other one for testing. Results are finally
obtained as the average value of the accuracy reported in these two tests.
In Figure 6.5 the performance of the single classifiers and of the proposed
systems are reported. Note that the last two single classifiers - third and fourth
rows - processed only e-mails with attached images.
It can be noted that the use of the BKS significantly improves the performance
of the single classifiers. It must be remarked, in fact, that the visual-based classi-
fier operates on a subset of the whole dataset (only 1953 mails out of 11652). It is
also interesting to note that the number of BKS units that are really activated on
the whole dataset is only 18, while their total number is 34, i.e. 81. This confirms
the considerations made in the previous Section.
Finally, in the Figure 6.5 we report a comparison of the results obtained by
our system with those obtainable with SpamAssassin in its standard configura-
tion and equipped with two plug-ins devised for filtering image spam, namely
3http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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Figure 6.7: Some examples of ham images
Figure 6.8: Some examples of spam images
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Figure 6.9: The accuracy of the single classifiers and of the proposed system.
Bayes-OCR4 and Fuzzy-OCR. It clearly appears that our approach significantly
outperforms both Bayes-OCR and Fuzzy-OCR, by reaching a significantly higher
accuracy. Finally, note the time needed for processing the whole dataset by our
system are practically the same needed by SpamAssassin with Fuzzy-OCR, while
is significantly faster than SpamAssassin equipped with Bayes-OCR.
Figure 6.10: Comparison between the proposed system and SpamAssassin
4This plug-in is available for download at the URL:
http://prag.diee.unica.it/n3ws1t0/?q=node/107
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6.6 Key findings
In this chapter we presented an approach for addressing the spam e-mail problems,
which takes into account some of the recent evolutions of the spammers’ tricks as
well as the limits of previous methodologies. We proposed to combine visual clues
with the semantic information related to the e-mail body by using the Behaviour
Knowledge Space rule. This approach allowed us to easily include new modules
in our architecture that could be required for addressing new spammers’ tricks.
This system can prevent the evasion problems, adversarial classification, mon-
itoring the spam and the folders, and adding or updating some modules to the
architecture if new kinds of spam are bypassing the antispam security system.
Tests on a dataset of e-mails containing attached images confirmed the effec-
tiveness of the approach and its applicability with respect to other widely used
opensource tool such as SpamAssassin.
Since the proposed approach has been mainly designed for deploying a per-
sonal antispam system, in the future we want to investigate how it is possible to
further improve its performance by customizing it with reference to a specific user.
This could be done by developing a specific module for taking into account spam
images received by the user A that are considered as ham by the user B, such as,
for example, those related to a phishing attack versus the user A.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
We demonstrated that Multiple Classifier Systems are a good choice for imple-
menting a pattern recognition system that have to operate in an Adversarial En-
vironment. They provide a good means for tackling the two challenges afforded
during this thesis: Adversarial Learning and Adversarial Classification.
In this chapter we will provide a brief summary of the work behind this thesis,
and will draw some general conclusions, by illustrating the key findings.
7.1 Our Contribution
The contribution of this thesis is to find out how an MCS approach could be the
better choice in the Adversarial Environment problem. We have designed several
MCS approaches for different tasks such as the cleaning of a training set (noisy
or contaminate), the definition of an antispam system and the identification of
Internet traffic flows.
In particular, we have defined a methodology to clean a training set through
a MCS approach, named SOCIAL. This system changes the labels associated to
the training set samples in accord with a dynamical adaptation of the degree of
belief associated to each base classifier. We presented some experimental results
in which the goodness of the approach is confirmed. In particular, we made a
comparison between a simple classifier trained with the cleaned dataset obtained
with the proposed approach, and the accuracy obtained with some Multiple Clas-
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sifier System presented in the literature. The results showed that a simple classi-
fier trained with the training set cleaned by SOCIAL, performs better than some
“state-of-the-art” MCS approaches.
Further examples of adversarial learning arise in the field of computer security
where there is an escalating competition between detection and evasion techniques
for various types of malware. In general, one can expect that whenever machine
learning is used to provide protection from some illegal activity, adversaries will
deliberately attempt to circumvent these approaches.
Due to the above considerations we have considered some interesting case
studies, and we find out what was the impact of an MCS approach for this field. In
particular, we have proposed a modular anti-spam approach to deal with the spam
transmitted through text and images. The modular architecture was designed to be
updated with new modules in order to efficiently cope with new types of spam.
We proposed also an hierarchical MCS approach for the Internet traffic iden-
tification problem, that try to distinguish among the different flows. In this case
the real-time feature was really important, and the system was designed to be fast
and accurate.
7.2 Key Findings
The core of this thesis consists in the study of the Multiple Classifier Systems to
address the problem of Adversarial Environments. We demonstrate that this kind
of systems are more robust to the noise and/or contamination of the training set
label.
We noticed that there are two possibility for an MCS, to force the diversity
among the classifiers in order to improve the accuracy or to force the convergence
of the decision. In this last case we are trying to obtain a sub-optimal but more
robust classification.
We pointed out that an MCS has a significant similarity with the non-linear
dynamic system, and with other physics phenomena.
Moreover, there are important similarities with the human behaviour too. In
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fact, if we want a stable society where the optimum is never reached in favour to
a stability issue, we are trying to a make a SOCIAL approach. If we want instead
to force the finding of an optimum it is more useful the competition instead of
the stability. This choice can reach an optimum forcing the diversity of the single
component (base-classifier).
Everything the human being has done that works properly, takes inspiration
from the nature. Even in this case there is a deep link with the natural evolution,
and we are really interested to focus our attention on this aspect, that is less sci-
entific but more philosophical. We really believe that a multiple classifier system
could simulate some human behaviours and it could be used as a decision support
system for real life events.
Appendix A
Dempster-Shafer Combination Rule
In this section we will apply the general methodology described in the chapter 4
using the Dempster-Shafer theory. This theory will be used to develop the Fusion
Block and for the base classifiers statistical characterization. That is for the R def-
inition we choose to use the Basic Probability Assignment, hereinafter bpa.
The theory of Dempster and Shafer (D-S theory) has been frequently applied to
deal with uncertainty management and incomplete reasoning. Differently from
the classical Bayesian theory, D-S theory can explicitly model the absence of in-
formation, while in case of absence of information a Bayesian approach attributes
the same probability to all the possible events.
According to the D-S theory, we used as R the bpa. It describes the subjective
degree of confidence attributed to it. What is modelled, then, is not the analysed
phenomenon, but the belief in the base classifiers report about it.
When assigning a bpa, there are some requirements which have to be met. They
descend from the fact that the bpa is still a probability function, hence has to
respect the constraints for mass probability functions. Each bpa is such that
m : 2θ → [0, 1], where θ indicates the so called frame of discernment. Usu-
ally, the frame of discernment θ consists of N mutually exclusive and exhaustive
hypotheses Ai, i = 1, . . . , N . A subset {Ai, . . . , Aj} ⊆ θ represents a new hy-
pothesis. As the number of possible subsets of θ is 2θ, the generic hypothesis is
an element of 2θ.
For example, if we only consider two hypotheses (classes), namely Positive(P)
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and Negative(N); hence, the frame of discernment is θ = {{P}, {N}} and 2θ =
{{P}, {N}, {P,N}}, whereas in the Bayesian case only the events {{P}, {N}}
would be considered.
{P} and {N} are referred to as simple events or singletons, while {P , N} is
referred to as composite event. Furthermore, also the following properties have to
hold:
m(∅) = 0
∑
A⊆2θ
m(A) = 1
A.1 Classifier Statistical Characterization
Starting from the same Weighted Confusion Matrix (tab. A.1) described in the
section 4.2.2, if we use as fusion block the Dempster-Shafer combination rule,
than the R will be a vector of bpa where each element will be composed by:
R(Ci) = bpa(Ci)(A.1)
bpa(Ci) = [m({C1}) = ei1,
m({C2}) = ei2,
.
.
.
m({Cn}) = eiM ,
m({C1, C2, . . . , CM}) = (1−
∑M
j=1 eij)]
(A.2)
Assigned Class
True Class Cˆ1 Cˆ2 . . . CˆM
C1 e11 e12 . . . e1n
C2 e21 e22 . . . e2n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
CM eM1 eM2 . . . eMM
Table A.1: Weighted Confusion Matrix (WCM) for M classes classification
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It is worth noting that in this case we use more information to characterize a
single classifier, and so we are making a more accurate base classifiers statistical
characterization than using the Weighted Majority Voting.
An open issue is to find another function r() that use more information about
the WCM. In this case we are not still using all the combined hypothesis.
A.2 Class and DoT Estimation
In this section we will describe how the system combine the R evaluated with r(),
and how it’s possible to obtain a DoT .
The aim of assigning a bpa is to describe the reliability of a particular classifier
in reporting a specific event. Such a representation is suitable for combination,
but as we want to deal with combined results in the same way, we also impose the
constraint that the combination of several bpa by means of the D-S rule still has
to be a bpa. The uncertainty in the final decision will be inversely proportional to
the extent to which the base classifiers agree. If we have B base classifiers, the
combination rule is such that:
m(A) = K
∑
TB
i=1 Ai=A
B∏
i=1
mi(Ai)
where:
K−1 = 1−
∑
TB
i=1 Ai=∅
B∏
i=1
mi(Ai)
=
∑
TB
i=1 Ai 6=∅
B∏
i=1
mi(Ai)
It is worth observing that the normalizing factor K is independent from any
specific value of A. The value K can therefore be considered a constant, once the
bpas are fixed.
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A.2.1 The two classes case
Now, we want to illustrate how it is possible to evaluate the the Class and DoT
described in the section 4.2.3 starting from a bpa values, that in our case represents
R. We remember that a bpa is a vector of real numbers.
In the simple case of two classes problem, P and N , we have defined this
value as:
Class =


P, if
m({P})−m({N})
1 +m({P,N}) > 0
N, Otherwise
(A.3)
DoT = abs
(
m({P})−m({N})
1 +m({P,N})
)
(A.4)
The value m({P})−m({N})
1+m({P,N})
is defined in such a way that, if its value is +1, there
is the highest reliability on the hypothesis P; if it is−1, it is quite sure that we are
observing a N hypothesis; if it is 0, there’s the maximum uncertainty, hence the
sample should be rejected.
In the first case, in fact, m({P}) = 0 while m({N}) = 1 and m({N,P}) =
0. In the second case, the opposite scenario is verified, as m({P}) = 0 while
m({N}) = 1 and m({N,P}) = 0. In the latter case instead, m({N}) = 0,
m({P}) = 0 and m({N,P}) = 1.
A.2.2 The M-Classes Case
We have tried to define different strategies to evaluate the DoT defined for a M-
Classes problem. For the sake of completeness we report both the strategies. The
first one is more linked to the Dempster theory, whereas the second one use a
transformation in a polar coordination. Both this strategy have their pro and cons,
that will be discussed in the respective system sections.
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General Case – Theoretical Method
This first formulation is based on the Hypothesis that we want to discriminate
between a class P and several of variations of fake Hypothesis. Let us call them
for example N1,N2, . . . ,Nn.
The general function which allows us to transform the bpa in a detection re-
sult descends from observation of the relations between Belief, Plausibility and
Uncertainty. Let A,B ∈ θ; hence:
Bel(B) =
∑
A⊂B
m(A) ; P ls(B) =
∑
A∩B 6=∅
m(A)(A.5)
Unc(B) = P ls(B)− Bel(B)(A.6)
In the two-event case, we observe that
Bel({N}) =m({N})
P ls({N}) =m({N}) +m({N,P})
Bel({P}) =m({P})
P ls({P}) =m({P}) +m({N,P})
Hence,
Unc({N}) = Unc({P} =
= m({N,P})
Then for all the simple and compound hypotheses H ∈ 2θ in which is not
present the P Hypothesis we have defined the following parameter:
YH =
m({H})
1 + Unc({H})(A.7)
Obviously also for the P class we have the same thing:
YP =
m({P})
1 + Unc({P})(A.8)
Important considerations:
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1. 0 ≤ YH ≤ 1
2. • YH = 0 =⇒ m(H) = 0
• YH = 1 =⇒ m(H) = 1 and Unc(H) = 0
• m(H) = 1 =⇒ YH = 1
3. if ∃H : YH = 1 =⇒ YN and all the other parameters are zero
4. 0 ≤∑YH ≤ 1
5. from the 3) and 4) it is clear that if a generic YH → 1 then all the other
parameters tend to 0.
Starting from the parameters defined in equation A.7 and equation A.8, we
can evaluate for each of the N simple Hypothesis Fi the following index:
I(Fi) =
∑
H∩Fi 6=∅
YH
nH
(A.9)
Where nH is the number of simple classes belong to H . The same for the class
P .
I(T ) = YT(A.10)
With these indexes we have defined new y and the new DoT as:
y =


P, if maxi{I(Fi)} − I(T ) < 0
Ni, if maxi{I(Fi)} − I(T ) < 0 | argmaxi{I(Fi)} − I(T )
(A.11)
DoT = max{I(Fi)} − I(T )(A.12)
It is important to notice that this final equation in the case of two hypotheses
become the equation A.4.
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A.2.3 General Case – Polar Coordinate Transformation Method
This method want to overcame the limitation of the previous one. In this case
all the classes are equally important. The starting point are the equation A.7 and
equation A.8 described in the previous section. With these Y parameters we trans-
form the bpa space in a polar coordinate system. To obtain this, we divide the
space into n angular sectors. The amplitude of each sector is:
Amplitude =
2π
n
(A.13)
In this way we can draw a vector in the middle of each angular sector. The
module of these vectors is equal to Yi values. These vectors represent the belief in
each class.
We define a vector that pass exactly in the middle of the angular sector and
have a module equal to Y value. In this way for each angular sector we will
correspond a class and we can define a function m() that maps each class into an
angular sector, that is, taken in input an angle θ, give the the class corresponding
to the angular sector in which the angle is in:
Class = m(θ)(A.14)
Starting from this considerations, the DoT and the y are calculated starting
from the resultant vector Yr = |Yr| ∗ ejα as:
y = m(α)(A.15)
DoT = |Yr| ∗ h(α,Amplitude)(A.16)
The h function is needed to give a weight to the position of the vector into the
angular sector. If the vector is exactly in the middle, we will be more certain that
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the true class was the one defined for that space, instead if it lies on the borderline
between two angular sectors, our degree of belief is lower. This function is defined
as:
h(α,Amplitude) = −
∣∣∣∣∣αr −
Amplitude
2
Amplitude
2
∣∣∣∣∣+ 1(A.17)
We have chosen the triangular function, but also the Gaussian function could
be a good choice.
For example, considering the case in which we have 4-classes C1, C2, C3, C4,
as shown in the figure A.1.
Figure A.1: A graphical example of the Yr evaluation
In this case, the result y will be C1 and the DoT will be the module of the red
arrow (Yr) weighted by the h() function.
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The cons of this approach is that the DoT depend on the coordinate system,
and on the position of the Hypotheses on the axis. If we change the position of an
hypothesis the value of the DoT will change.
Also in this case, as the previous one, if we consider only two Hypotheses we
return at the equation A.4.
Appendix B
Bayesian Combining Rule
In this section we will apply the general methodology described in the chapter 4
using the Bayesian Combining Rule [14], as also described in section 3.3.3.
This rule will be used to develop the Fusion Block and for the classifiers char-
acterization. That is, for defining R we choose to use a vector of probability
estimation calculated staring from the Weighted Confusion Matrix.
B.1 Classifiers Statistical Characterization
Starting from the same WCM (tab. B.1) described in the section 4.2.2, if we use
as fusion block the Bayesian Combining Rule, than the R will be:
Assigned Class
True Class Cˆ1 Cˆ2 . . . CˆM
C1 e11 e12 . . . e1n
C2 e21 e22 . . . e2n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
CM eM1 eM2 . . . eMM
Table B.1: Weighted Confusion Matrix (WCM) for M classes classification
R(Ci) =
eii∑n
j=1 eji
, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N(B.1)
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The equation B.1 expresses the a posteriori probability that a classifier gives
the correct answer.
As in this case of Dempster-Shafer Combing Rule (Appendix A) we use more
information to characterize a single classifier, and so we are making a more accu-
rate base classifiers statistical characterization than using the Weighted Majority
Voting.
For example, if we consider the WCM in table B.2
Assigned Class
True Class Aˆ Bˆ Cˆ
A 0.7 0.1 0.1
B 0.2 0.5 0.1
C 0.3 0 0.6
Table B.2: Possible Weighted Confusion Matrix for a three classes problem
R(A) =
0.7
0.7 + 0.2 + 0.3
= 0.58
R(B) =
0.5
0.1 + 0.5 + 0
= 0.83
R(C) =
0.6
0.1 + 0.1 + 0.6
= 0.75
B.2 Class and DOT Estimation
In this section we will describe how the system combines the R evaluated with the
r() function, and how it is possible to obtain the DoT .
In particular, if we indicate with (yˆki = Cj) the event that the k − th classifier
assigns the input samples xi to the class Cj, the output class y will be:
y = argmaxj P (xi ∈ Cj|yˆ1i = Cj, yˆ2i = Cj, . . . , yˆMi = Cj)(B.2)
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If the classifiers can be assumed independent among each other and the a
priori probability is the same for all the classes, it can be shown that the eq. B.2
can be written as:
C = argmaxj
M∏
k=1
P (xi ∈ Cj |yˆki = Cj)(B.3)
And the DoT will be calculated as:
DoT = maxj
M∏
k=1
P (xi ∈ Cj |yˆki = Cj)(B.4)
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